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INFORMATIONAL REGULATION, THE
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE PUBLIC
KATRINA FISCHER KUH*
Informational Regulation, the Environment, and the Public generates a typology
to analyze how public disclosure functions in informational regulation. In the
environmental context, informational regulation compels the public disclosure of
environmental information without mandating substantive environmental outcomes in
the expectation that disclosure itself will prompt beneficial change in the environmental
context. Application of the Article’s typology reveals that the emperor has no clothes:
Communication of environmental information to the public is considered central to
policies employing informational regulation, but the information produced pursuant to
these measures largely fails to reach or be understood by lay individuals. For example,
empirical data shows that corporations required to publicly report releases under the
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) do change their conduct to reduce those releases despite
being under no legal obligation to do so. Most people, however, are wholly unaware
of the information disclosed under the TRI and, even if made aware of it, unable to
comprehend its significance. This insight calls into question oft-cited normative bases
for environmental information regulation, including that it supports individual
autonomy (by informing choice about exposure to risk) and enriches civic perspective
(by enhancing participation in administrative process and other civic behaviors).
Critical examination of how informational regulation works and the effects it produces
is timely and important. Environmental law increasingly embraces policies that
employ informational regulation—it is, for example, central to current proposals to
require greater disclosure of climate change risk under securities laws and constitutes
a core element of many Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) protocols. Yet,
close analysis suggests that the success of public disclosure at prompting upstream
effects (changing the behavior of regulated entities) masks its general failure to speak
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assistance of students Kyle Schiedo, Nina Marinaro, Shaune Hickson, Madison Shaff, and Stephanie
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to the lay public. Improving informational regulation requires a clear-eyed assessment
of its limitations and a recognition that information cannot simply be pumped into the
public domain and expected to enlighten individuals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
How best to generate and strategically deploy information to support
environmental regulation (informational regulation) has emerged as an area of
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sustained interest in environmental scholarship and policy.1 Approaches
grounded in the disclosure of information are now an established policy tool in
some contexts and heralded as a promising policy tool in others.2 Two EPA
1. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 279–98 (9th ed. 2021) (describing the
development of “regulation through revelation”). See also Daniel C. Esty & Quentin Karpilow,
Harnessing Investor Interest in Sustainability: The Next Frontier in Environmental Information
Regulation, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 625, 634 (2019) (considering how to adapt environmental information
regulation in the context of sustainable investing). The use of informational regulation extends beyond
the environmental realm to other policy arenas. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and
Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618–19 (1999) (describing
informational regulation simply as “regulation through disclosure” and noting that informational
regulation is “far from new to American law” and that disclosure of information has been a pervasive
regulatory strategy dating to the New Deal, and that its usage increased significantly following the
rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s); MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE
OF TECHNOPOPULISM 4, 21–60 (2002) (“In the last decade, government by disclosure has emerged as
a third wave of modern risk regulation.”). The term “informational regulation” is used broadly here to
encompass the strategic use of information to achieve environmental benefits without mandates or
direct market intervention and information disclosure incorporated into regulatory schemes that
include such mandates. See Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern, Exploring New Tools for Environmental
Protection, in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 5 (Thomas Dietz & Paul S. Stern eds.,
2002) (describing “new tools” of environmental policy that “all have one or both of two features. They
use education and the provision of information to try to change behavior, and the changes in behavior
are voluntary in the sense that they are not driven by specific regulatory directives, externality taxes,
or permit markets.”). See also Clifford S. Russell & Christopher D. Clark, The Provision of
Environmental Information as a Regulatory Instrument, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND
CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR, at 114 (Signe Krarup & Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005) (describing types and
variations of information disclosure); compare David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting
as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 383 (2005)
(defining informational regulation narrowly to mean “government mandated public disclosure of
information on the environmental performance of regulated entities.”).
2. E.g., PERCIVAL, SCHROEDER, MILLER & LEAPE, supra note 1, at 279–98; Sunstein, supra note
1, at 618–24; JASON J. CZARNEZKI, EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE & INDIVIDUAL
BEHAVIOR 141 (2011) (observing that “two overwhelming themes emerge for promoting everyday
environmentalism, both relying on information as a driver for change”); Case, supra note 1, at 384
(observing that “[u]se of information disclosure as a regulatory tool is described as the ‘third phase’ in
the evolution of pollution control policy, following initial phases of traditional legal regulation (i.e.,
command-and-control) and market-based approaches (such as tradable permits and emission
charges.”). See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1268,
1272 (1995) (describing “reflexive” environmental law, which often uses information strategies such
as environmental labels). Important research identifies how traditional regulation can burden
regulators with information-gathering demands and frustrate the development and effective use of
environmental information. E.g., Bradley Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 285 (2001);
Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to Produce Needed
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1625 (2004); Wendy E. Wagner,
Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 776 (1997).
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officials highlighted the expanding role of such approaches, noting that “[t]he
mandatory disclosure of information to the public is an increasingly pervasive
and important regulatory tool that has become ‘one of the most striking
developments in the last generation of American law.’”3 As of this writing, the
Securities and Exchange Commission is contemplating adopting new guidance
about whether, when, and how securities laws require disclosures relating to
climate change.4 And, notably, disclosure also features prominently in private
environmental governance approaches, often constituting a core aspect of
voluntary private standard regimes and labeling.5
Most iterations of informational regulation in the environmental context
function through the generation and public disclosure of information,6 and
technological advance continues to increase the capacity to develop and
disseminate environmental information.7 Moreover, advances in monitoring
Many scholars have detailed the benefits of informational regulation, particularly as compared to
traditional approaches in some contexts; others note not only the potential benefits of informational
regulation, but also the potential for better environmental information to improve other modalities of
environmental regulation. E.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 119 (2004); Bradley Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling
Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1435–38 (2008) (reviewing
the benefits of the Toxics Release Inventory and lamenting that “state and local governments have
been slow to embrace environmental baseline reporting and monitoring systems based on the TRI
model.”); Bradley Karkkainen, Framing Rules: Breaking the Information Bottleneck, 17 N.Y.U.
ENV’T. L.J. 75, 80–81 (2008).
3. David A. Hindin & Jon D. Silberman, Designing More Effective Rules and Permits, 7 GEO.
L.J. OF ENERGY & ENV’T. L. 103, 118 (2016) (citing Sunstein, supra note 1, at 613).
4. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PUBLIC STATEMENT: PUBLIC INPUT WELCOMED
ON CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURES (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/lee-climate-change-disclosures [https://perma.cc/W2M6-WPYN].
5. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129,
147–61 (2013) (providing an overview of private environmental governance approaches and
describing numerous ways in which they incorporate information disclosure, including by observing
that “[s]everal private organizations have emerged in the last two decades to gather and disseminate
environmental information” including the Global Reporting Initiative and the Carbon Disclosure
Project and explaining that the Equator Principles “are a set of environmental assessment and
disclosure requirements that major banks agree to impose on project finance borrowers for projects
around the world”).
6. Paul Rleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK
ANALYSIS 155, 157 (1998) (emphasizing the role of “public opinion” in environmental informational
regulation).
7. While there is a recognized paucity of at least some types of environmental information, Eric
Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2011); Wagner,
Commons Ignorance, supra note 2, at 1624. Many observe that technology is poised to significantly
increase its availability and use. E.g., Esty, supra note 2, at 118; Gregg Macey, The Architecture of
Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627, 1639–40 (2013); see generally David L. Markell & Robert L.
Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and Application, Part I, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 563 (2016).
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capacity have begun to change the regulatory landscape8 as, increasingly, the
public is able to generate information through its own monitoring efforts.9 The
dynamic character of informational regulation opportunities, in tandem with
their growing use and, more generally, sharpening concerns about public
reception of (in particular, scientific) information,10 highlights the importance
of developing a more robust understanding of this piece of the “environmental
policy toolkit.”11
Much of the analysis of how informational regulation functions has focused
on use of such regulation in specific environmental contexts—such as with
respect to specific statutes or types of statutes,12 with respect to the

The increasing availability and accessibility of many types of environmental information on EPA’s
website, including graphic and visual, attests to this; the capacity to map environmental justice areas
is particularly notable. EJSCREEN: Environmental Justice and Mapping Tool, ENV’T. PROT.
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen [https://perma.cc/YG69-6WJV].
8. For treatment of these issues, see Robert L. Glicksman, David L. Markell & Claire
Monteleoni, Technological Innovation, Data Analytics, and Environmental Enforcement, 44 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 41 (2016).
9. While early forms of informational regulation were based primarily on the disclosure or
accessibility of information to the public from various sources (e.g., the government and regulated
parties), we also believe that informational regulation includes reliance on the public to generate
information. E.g., Markell & Glicksman, supra note 7, at 613–14 (discussing EPA’s Next Generation
Compliance initiative, which includes increased reliance on citizen monitoring capacity); Case, supra
note 1, at 383 (explaining that informational regulation in the environmental context functions by
“enlist[ing] the aid of non-governmental forces, particularly economic markets and public opinion, to
either complement or substitute for traditional regulatory strategies of government standard setting and
enforcement.”).
10. E.g., Salman Bin Naeem & Rubina Bhatti, The Covid‐19 ‘Infodemic’: A New Front for
Information Professionals, HEALTH INFO LIBR J. 10.1111/hir.12311 (June 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7323420/ [https://perma.cc/3S83-22YZ] (describing
the public’s reaction to information relating to the Covid-19 pandemic as an “infodemic”).
11. Clifford S. Russell, Signe Krarup & Christopher D. Clark, Environment, Information and
Consumer Behaviour: An Introduction, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER
BEHAVIOUR (Signe Krarup & Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005) (“It seems fair to say that over the past
two decades . . . [t]he provision of environmental information about products, processes that lead to
the products, and producers of the products (owners of the processes) has become an accepted, if by
no means fully understood, part of the environmental policy toolkit.”).
12. E.g., Alexander Volokh, The Pitfalls of the Environmental Right-to-Know, 2002 UTAH L.
REV. 805 (2002) (critiquing public engagement under environmental right to know laws, primarily
reporting under the Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act); Clifford Rechtschaffen,
The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303
(1996) (critiquing the communication of warnings to the public under Proposition 65); Jonathan
Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National Environmental Policy Act’s Process for
Citizen Participation, 26 ENV’T. L. 53 (1996) (critiquing public disclosure under NEPA).
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communication of risk,13 for the purpose of influencing individual behaviors,14
or in the context of corporate disclosure.15 Less effort has been made, however,
to broadly assess and focus on the public’s role16 in environmental
informational regulation through a contextual analysis of the use of
informational regulation across multiple legal regimes.17 The term “public” is
used to mean lay people (individuals) and the disclosure mechanisms analyzed
make (or seek to make) information available to individuals broadly, although
it is clear that it is often only some subset of the public (such as environmental
groups or other sophisticated intermediaries) that in fact access and use the
disclosed information.18
Developing a better understanding of how
informational environmental regulation functions vis à vis the public across
different contexts is important; all of the informational regulation measures
examined are justified as means to provide information to the public so as to
support individual autonomy or enrich civic perspective, identify
communication with the public as an express purpose, and seek to use
information to change public behavior.19 This Article offers such a
contextualized broader review.
In Part II, this Article proposes a typology for conceptualizing the varied
purposes and mechanisms of environmental governance schemes that rely on
informational disclosure approaches, focusing on how these schemes position
13. E.g., Brenda J. Nordenstam & Joseph F. DiMento, Right-to-Know: Implications of Risk
Communication Research for Regulatory Policy, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 333 (1989) (analyzing how
risk communication research could improve laws that disclose environmental hazards to the public);
Wip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 283, 288 (1988) (analyzing consumer response to risk information, in particular
information about small risks, and concluding in part that “when individuals are informed of small
risks there will be a tendency for them to over-react to the information and to treat the risk as being
greater than it actually is. It will be very difficult to convey information to people in a meaningful
fashion about very low probability risks. Perhaps the major danger from any risk-communication
effort is that instead of informing people these programs will serve to unduly alarm them.”).
14. Russell, Krarup & Clark, supra note 11, at 1.
15. Esty & Karpilow, supra note 1, at 634; Hari M. Osofsky, Jacqueline Peel, Brett McDonnell
& Anita Forester, Energy Re-Investment, 94 IND. L. J. 595, 621 (2019).
16. This Article returns to the importance of the definition of the “public” and the distinction
between lay citizens and organized groups in Part IV.
17. Other efforts to better understand the public’s role in environmental informational disclosure
include New Tools for Environmental Protection, which focuses on the use of communication and
diffusion to change individual environmental behaviors and has chapters addressing inter alia
household energy conservation, household recycling, eco-labels and environmental education. Dietz
& Stern, supra note 1, at 49–104, 147–60. See also Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 6, at 155, 157
(1998); Sunstein, supra note 1, at 618–24; Tom Tietenberg, Disclosure Strategies for Pollution
Control, 11 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 587, 587–88 (1998); Esty, supra note 2, at 119.
18. See infra, Part IV.
19. See infra, Part II.
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individuals (the public). It suggests that most informational regulation schemes
in the environmental context disclose information for the purpose of engaging
the public in one or more of three ways. One purpose of public information
disclosure is to inform individuals, including their civic or consumer choices
(public as audience). A second is to prompt upstream third parties (e.g.,
government agencies, emitters, companies, and consumer product producers)
to take actions relevant to the environment (public as a catalyst for upstream
changes). The third is to directly change environmental behaviors of
individuals in a desired direction (public as target).
Part III applies this typology to different environmental governance
contexts in which informational regulation occupies an important role: The
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program,20 Proposition 65,21 the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),22 eco-labeling (specifically, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Organic Seal),23 and behavioral
interventions (such as fish advisories).24
Part IV concludes by synthesizing findings from the case studies in Part III
and exploring their implications.
The key findings are relatively
straightforward: Information disclosure catalyzes upstream behavior in all of
the settings studied in which disclosure was intended to have that effect. On
the other hand, informational regulation generally fails to educate the public as
an audience for environmental information.25 This Article identifies and
explores several important governance questions suggested by the struggle of
informational regulation to educate the public as an audience and the apparent
disconnect between its relative success as a catalyst and relative failure as an
audience strategy. The difficulty of using informational regulation to
effectively educate the public as audience calls into question justifications for
informational regulation grounded in enhancement of personal autonomy or
civic engagement. The disconnect between the failure of disclosed information
to meaningfully educate the public and its apparent success at achieving
upstream catalyst effects encourages greater awareness and scrutiny of the
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012).
21. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Proposition 65, 1986 Cal. Stat. A219, codified at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25249.5–.13.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(f).
23. 7 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq.
24. See infra notes 238–83 and accompanying text.
25. A healthy dose of humility should accompany these conclusions given a host of challenges,
including determining metrics and data limitations. These findings should not be overstated—
especially for some of the case studies, the literatures concerning outcomes are at a nascent stage and
very much still developing; further, in some cases these literatures are much more impressionistic than
comprehensive.
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dynamics producing upstream catalyst effects. This disconnect also cautions
that information disclosure should not be assumed to necessarily enhance
alignment of civil society norms and regulated party behavior.
II. HOW INFORMATIONAL REGULATION STRATEGIES POSITION THE PUBLIC:
AUDIENCE, CATALYST, TARGET
Informational regulation strategies are likely to have one or more of three
primary purposes. First, informational regulation in the environmental context
can position the public as the audience for disclosed information for the purpose
of improving public understanding of an environmental fact or issue.26 Often,
the hope is that improved public understanding will inform individual choice
and thereby strengthen the exercise of personal autonomy. For example,
Proposition 65 mandates the labeling of products containing specified
substances that may present health risks in part to allow individuals to choose
whether to accept a risk arising from exposure to those substances.27 Improved
public understanding can also be a means to enhance deliberative democracy
by “enabl[ing] citizens to oversee government action and also to assess the need
for less, more, or different regulation” by “inform[ing] them of both private and
public activity.”28
Disclosure of environmental information to the public can also serve as a
catalyst for influencing the behavior of a wide range of upstream actors,
including parties traditionally regulated under the environmental laws (e.g.,
industrial facilities), producers of consumer products (e.g., food producers), and
the government.29 For example, public disclosures required under the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI)30 and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)31
26. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 34 (2014). In their book critiquing mandated disclosure, Omri
Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider appear to assess disclosure primarily through the lens of whether it
achieves this audience function, beginning from the twin premises that mandated disclosure
“principally seeks to help people confronting unfamiliar and complex decisions in transactions with
knowledgeable people with interests of their own” and succeeds by “providing information that equips
disclosees to understand their choice well enough that they analyze it and make a well-informed, wellconsidered decision.” Id.
27. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25601 (2018). See also infra Part III.B (describing Proposition
65’s purposes and disclosures requirements).
28. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 625–26.
29. Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual As Regulated Entity in
the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 531 (2004) (“Even in the new field of
informational regulation, however, the principal focus of the regulatory debate and of existing
environmental regulations has been on large industrial firms.”).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2006).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370(f) (2006).
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are designed in part to influence, respectively, the environmental performance
of entities subject to TRI reporting requirements32 and the consideration of the
environment in government decision making.33 Similarly, the Organic Seal
program, which sets national standards for organic certification, is intended in
part to influence producers of such products.34 The mere fact that the
information is or will be publicly available can motivate upstream entities to
change course, based in part on predicted or actual public reaction (among other
reasons).35 The predicted or actual public response to the disclosed information
thereby functions as a catalyst for the upstream private or governmental
action.36
Finally, the public can also be the target of informational regulation.
Informational regulation treats the public as a target where the governance
effort seeks to use information disclosure to persuade individuals to change
their behavior in a particular direction for a public health or environmental
reason.37 Sometimes, the goal is to protect public health by reducing public
exposure to environmental harms (as, for example, in the case of fish
consumption advisories).38 Regulation can also seek to use information
disclosure to encourage individuals to take actions that benefit the environment
and avoid actions that harm the environment. Examples include stenciling
storm drains to indicate the receiving water body to discourage individuals from

32. Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Expediting Community Right-to-Know Initiatives, 60 Fed.
Reg. 41,791 (Aug. 11, 1995).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.
34. 7 U.S.C. § 6501.
35. As noted below, companies’ perceptions concerning the nature and likelihood of citizen
responses to disclosures may differ from the reality. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
Regulated entities and others may be motivated to change their behavior for other reasons in addition
to possible citizen response. See infra note 100 (noting that some companies reduced their release of
TRI chemicals because the TRI disclosures were the first time the companies’ highest-level officials
became aware of the scope of such releases).
36. See infra Part III.
37. Others have described positioning the public as a target of informational regulation as a tool
of communication and diffusion that employs a “social marketing” strategy. See Dietz & Stern eds.,
supra note 1, at 45 (“A target behavior is identified on the basis of its presumed environmental benefits,
and communication and diffusion instruments are mobilized to increase the prevalence of the target
behavior in a target population. . . . It normally focuses on behaviors that have fairly direct impacts on
environmental quality—behaviors such as recycling of household wastes, use of private or public
transport, and household appliance purchases and maintenance, rather than on behaviors that may
affect the environment indirectly by influencing public policy.”).
38. See infra Part III; ENV’T PROT. AGENCY & FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., WHAT YOU NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT MERCURY IN FISH AND SHELLFISH (Mar. 2004); Env’t Prot. Agency & Food and Drug
Admin., Advice About Eating Fish: Availability of Draft Update, 79 Fed. Reg. 33559 (June 11, 2014).
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contributing harmful materials39 and providing individuals with better data
about their energy use to encourage conservation.40
There is overlap between the concepts of audience, catalyst, and target.
Disclosure may be designed to educate the public and motivate the public to act
in certain ways and thereby catalyze changes in the behavior of upstream actors.
The separate categories for catalyst, audience, and target strategies, however,
capture important distinctions between these purposes of public disclosure.
With respect to the audience and target strategies, for example, while the former
can be agnostic as to a particular result, the “target” policy seeks to encourage
the public to act in a specified manner.41 If, for example, an individual
encountered and understood a fish advisory but nonetheless chose to consume
fish at higher-than-recommended levels, the advisory would have succeeded as
an audience measure (by educating individuals and allowing the exercise of
informed choice) but failed as a target measure (to the extent that it sought to
encourage individuals to avoid levels of risk deemed unacceptable).
39. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Regulations for Revision of the Water
Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68722, 68755 (1999)
(requiring small MS4 operators to adopt stormwater management programs that include public
outreach and observing that “[e]xamples of strategies include distributing brochures or fact sheets,
sponsoring speaking engagements before community groups, providing public service announcements,
implementing educational programs targeted at school age children, and conducting community-based
projects such as storm drain stenciling, and watershed and beach cleanups.”). See also ENV’T PROT.
AGENCY,
STORMWATER
PHASE
II
FINAL
RULE:
PUBLIC
EDUCATION
&
OUTREACH MINIMUM CONTROL MEASURE (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201812/documents/epa_stormwater_phase_ii_final_rule_factsheet_2.3_public_education_12-0418.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FPF-BJHJ].
40. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 17381–17388 (2006) (funding
research and development of the smart grid); Centerpoint Energy and U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy
Daniel Poneman Announce Results of Pilot Project on Home Energy Use, DEP’T OF ENERGY, (July.
26, 2011), https://www.energy.gov/articles/centerpoint-energy-and-us-deputy-secretary-energydaniel-poneman-announce-results-pilot [https://perma.cc/5RC9-G7KV] (describing increased energy
efficiency behaviors by consumers using smart grid technology funded through the Recovery Act).
41. By requiring the provision of risk information associated with exposures to consumers, for
example, Proposition 65 does not seek to dictate the level of risk exposure that consumers should prefer
or demand, but instead recognizes that consumers may prefer less risk than that permitted by regulators
and empowers them to exercise that preference. See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text,
discussing the legislative history of Proposition 65. See also SUSAN G. HADDEN, A CITIZEN’S RIGHT
TO KNOW 15–17 (1989) (describing different types and objectives of right to know). The distinction
between positioning the public as an audience versus a target is not always precise as informational
regulation often seeks to educate individuals in order to change (or at least in order to enable individuals
to choose whether to change) their behaviors. For present purposes, the key distinction is whether
information is provided for the purpose of changing behavior in a specific of desired direction. Using
this metric, the USDA Organic Seal positions the public primarily as an audience (because it seeks to
enable consumers to identify and choose organic products, but does not seek to persuade them to do
so) and fish consumption advisories and energy conservation, recycling, and similar measures position
the public primarily as a target (because they seek to encourage individuals to behave in
environmentally salutary or health-protective ways).
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III. CASE STUDIES OF THE USE OF INFORMATIONAL REGULATION
This Part surveys the use of informational regulation in different contexts,
ranging from primarily “extra-regulatory” to serving as an important feature of
an elaborate regulatory scheme.
A. The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI)
The Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), adopted as section 313 of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act,42 is widely viewed
as an example of innovative and successful informational regulation in the
environmental context because of the significant number of companies that
have changed their operations to reduce their generation of pollution, at least in
part because of TRI.43 Assessments of TRI, however, also suggest that while
the law’s required public disclosure has had a significant impact as a catalyst—
i.e., influencing upstream (especially private, commercial) behavior––it often
fails to engage the public effectively as an audience for environmental
information, in this context primarily information about environmental health
risk.
1. How TRI works
TRI requires “covered entities”44 to prepare and submit annual toxic
chemical release forms45 that disclose, inter alia, information about the use,
disposal and release of listed chemicals.46 Covered entities submit toxic
42. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat. 1613, 1728–58, codified as 42 USC § 11001 (2006).
43. E.g., Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines, supra note 2, at 1435–38; MICHAEL E. KRAFT,
MARK STEPHAN & TROY D. ABEL, COMING CLEAN: INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 10 (2011) (noting that TRI “has become something of a poster child
for the efficacy of environmental information disclosure requirements”); see also id. at 54 (“Policy
scholars continue to cite the TRI program as perhaps the premier example of a federal nonregulatory
environmental program that has worked fairly well.”) (citations omitted). But see Volokh, supra note
12, at 807 (critiquing TRI and concluding that “environmental information, as required under current
law, is often misleading and provides a distorted picture of the health and environmental effects of
chemical use.”).
44. Covered entities are essentially large facilities that use toxic chemicals above threshold
amounts. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b) (“[O]wners and operators of facilities that have 10 or more full-time
employees and that are in Standard Industrial Classification Codes 20 through 39 (as in effect on July
1, 1985) and that manufactured, processed, or otherwise used a toxic chemical listed under subsection
(c) of this section in excess of the quantity of that toxic chemical established under subsection (f) of
this section during the calendar year for which a release form is required.”).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(g)(C) (“[P]rovide for submission of each of the following items of
information for each listed toxic chemical known to be present at the facility: (i) Whether the toxic
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chemical release forms to the EPA and a designated state official,47 and the
forms are (with some exceptions) publicly available.48 EPA is required by the
statute to maintain TRI data in a publicly accessible computer data base.49
The statute does not require that the data generated be user-friendly. It
directs EPA to “establish and maintain in a computer data base a national toxic
chemical inventory based on data submitted” through the TRI program.50 For
many years, the EPA TRI database was unwieldy and difficult to navigate.51
The Agency has made significant improvements and, although many available
tools for accessing TRI data still require specialized knowledge,52 some data are
now available in more lay-user-friendly formats, described as “TRI Tools for
Most Users.”53 Using these tools, anyone can identify TRI facilities and a host
of related information (including the volume and content of reported releases
from a facility) by entering a city, zip code, street address, etc.54
However, although the data is now more readily available, understanding
its meaning and significance remains challenging. The site identifies Potential
Risk based on a Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) score.55 The
chemical at the facility is manufactured, processed, or otherwise used, and the general category or
categories of use of the chemical. (ii) An estimate of the maximum amounts (in ranges) of the toxic
chemical present at the facility at any time during the preceding calendar year. (iii) For each
wastestream, the waste treatment or disposal methods employed, and an estimate of the treatment
efficiency typically achieved by such methods for that wastestream. (iv) The annual quantity of the
toxic chemical entering each environmental medium.”).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(h); 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j) (“The Administrator shall establish and maintain in a computer data
base a national toxic chemical inventory based on data submitted to the Administrator under this
section. The Administrator shall make these data accessible by computer telecommunication and other
means to any person on a cost reimbursable basis.”).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j).
51. Bradley P. Hartman, Toxic Chemical Release Inventory Database, 1 ENV’T L. 941, 947–54
(1995) (describing the then-existing process for accessing information from EPA’s TRI database).
Beginning in 1998, the Environmental Defense Fund sponsored a private website, scorecard.org, that
provided a similarly user-friendly means of accessing TRI data. Online “Chemical Scorecard” Puts
Pollution on Display in EDF LETTER VOL. XXIX, NO. 3 (Env’t Def. Fund), June 1998, at 1, 5,
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/178_Jun98.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH8U-FDD4] (describing
scorecard.org as a “unique new Internet service launched by EDF [that] allows anyone to enter a
zipcode and see a map highlighting local sources of pollution.”). The Right-to-Know Network also
hosted a now defunct site providing access to TRI data, previously available at https://rtk.rjifuture.org/.
52. TRI Data and Tools, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventorytri-program/tri-data-and-tools [https://perma.cc/92VV-CC67].
53. Id.
54. TRI
Search,
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://edap.epa.gov/public/extensions/newTRISearch/newTRISearch.html? [https://perma.cc/A6DD8932].
55. Id.
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meaning and significance of the associated value is somewhat inscrutable, at
least to a lay audience. EPA developed RSEI to assist the development of
regulatory priorities based on TRI data; it was meant to enable a “focus on
chemicals, industry sectors, and facilities with the greatest potential for chronic
human health risk.”56 Facilities appear in a color that corresponds to a range of
RSEI scores (with darker colors and higher scores presumably signaling more
risk); in the Potential Risk section, users see a numerical RSEI score.57 The site
explains that the “RSEI Score is a unitless value that accounts for the size of
the chemical release, how the chemical degrades and moves through the
environment, the size and location of the exposed population, and the
chemical’s toxicity;”58 under a “More Info” button, the site explains further that
RSEI scores are “calculated as a toxicity weight multiplied by the exposed
population multiplied by the estimated dose. RSEI Scores are only meaningful
in comparison to other RSEI Scores.”59 For example, “[a] RSEI Score that is
10 times higher than another RSEI Score suggests that the relative potential for
risk is 10 times greater.”60 EPA also publishes a PDF guide on the TRI site
map entitled “Factors to Consider When Using Toxics Release Inventory
Data.”61 Although written in accessible language, the Guide’s length (39 pages)
and content attest to the challenges for lay public encountering TRI data. The
guide explains that not all toxic chemicals fall within the TRI framework, that
not all TRI chemical releases are required to be reported, and that a release of
TRI chemicals does not necessarily mean that hazards are present in a
community.62 The guide also explains that the TRI is fundamentally inadequate
to assess risk for its lack of information about toxicity, bioconcentration, and
methods of exposure, among other missing factors. The guide emphasizes the
limitation of a RSEI score for evaluating individual risk and encourages users
to access the “myRTK” mobile application to assess risk, with an embedded

56. How RSEI Should Be Used, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/rsei/how-rseishould-be-used [https://perma.cc/935P-MFBV].
57. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 54.
58. Toxics
Release
Inventory,
Potential
Risks,
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://edap.epa.gov/public/extensions/newTRISearch/newTRISearch.html? [https://perma.cc/ECB893U7].
59. Id.
60. Understanding
RSEI
Results,
ENV’T
PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/rsei/understanding-rsei-results [https://perma.cc/XC45-XAUL].
61. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN USING TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY
DATA
(2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201903/documents/factors_to_consider_march_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RMB-XYY8].
62. Id.
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link to download the app.63 The link directs the user to a webpage informing
the user that the app is no longer available.64
2. Purposes
As evidenced by its text, legislative history, and exhortations throughout its
implementation, TRI disclosure is understood both as a means to educate
individuals as an audience and to catalyze changes in the behavior of upstream
regulated entities and policymakers. Embodying TRI’s goal of educating
individuals as an audience, the statute provides that TRI data “are intended to
provide information to . . . the public, including citizens of communities
surrounding covered facilities . . . to inform persons about releases of toxic
chemicals to the environment . . . .”65 President Clinton observed that the
statute was designed to “provide a basic informational tool to encourage
informed community-based environmental decision making [audience] and
provide a strong incentive for businesses to find their own ways of preventing
pollution [catalyst].”66
EPA explains that the TRI program’s objectives include educating the
public (audience) and empowering the public to work with others to reduce
releases (catalyst):
The goal of EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program is
to empower citizens and other TRI stakeholders through
information about how toxic chemicals are managed. Using
TRI data and EPA’s suite of TRI-related tools, one can:
Identify potential environmental concerns and gain a better
understanding of potential risks; Identify priorities and
opportunities to work with industry, government and
communities to reduce toxic chemical releases and potential
risks associated with them; Provide the members of your
community with information and insights regarding toxic
chemical releases and waste management practices in the
community; Make informed decisions on the consequences of
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11023(h) (emphasis added).
66. Memorandum for the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Expediting Community Right-to-Know Initiatives, 60 Fed.
Reg. 41791 (Aug. 11, 1995). See also Jeanne Herb, Susan Helms & Michael J. Jensen, Harnessing the
“Power of Information”: Environmental Right to Know as a Driver of Sound Environmental Policy,
in NEW TOOLS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 254 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2002)
(highlighting TRI’s audience function, noting that TRI was “based on the philosophic underpinnings
that citizens who are informed about hazardous chemicals in their communities can make more
educated decisions about their own protection.”).
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such practices and take action; and Establish reduction targets
and measure progress toward those targets.67
Although proponents anticipated and hoped that an informed public would
have instrumental value as a catalyst for upstream change (by creating pressure
for voluntary improvements by polluting entities and more robust laws and
enforcement), informing the public was also understood to have independent
“moral and ethical value” grounded in individuals’ “‘right-to-know’ the risks
they face.”68 Informing the public as an audience69 was, in short, an important
rationale motivating TRI’s enactment, in addition to influencing upstream
behavior.70
3. Results
a. Audience
Several commentators have concluded that TRI has not proven to be a
particularly effective tool for directly informing the lay public (individuals) as
an audience. They suggest that TRI has done little to foster the public’s
understanding of the nature and significance of toxic substances in
communities.71 As William Pederson put it, “TRI in its present form does not
and cannot achieve its ostensible goal of accurately informing the public about
toxic releases.” 72
The difficulties TRI encounters communicating effectively to individuals
can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) the means by which TRI
provides data to the public; (2) the content of the data that TRI generates; and

67. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 61.
68. David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 21
ENV’T L. REP. 10773, 10776 (2001).
69. There certainly seems to be some expectation that access to TRI data could influence, in
particular, individuals’ civic behaviors, and TRI’s disclosure can thus be understood as positioning the
public as both an audience and a catalyst. TRI does not position the public as a target because the goal
of disclosure is not to persuade individuals to take a particular action, but instead to inform individuals
to allow them to better discern and act upon their own preferences.
70. Herb, Helms & Jensen, supra note 66, at 254 (observing that while TRI “data is intended to
drive environmental performance at industrial facilities by affecting a host of sectors in society” the
“political rhetoric surrounding EPCRA was on empowering local citizens to make personal
decisions.”).
71. Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 13, at 345–46; Herb, Helms & Jensen, supra note 66, at
260 (“A recommitment needs to be made to have policymakers, the environmental community, and
industry come together to reexamine how best to provide the public with a full understanding of the
nature of information to which the public has a right to know.”).
72. William F. Pederson, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and
Beyond, 25 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 151, 152 (2001).
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(3) limitations in and characteristics of individuals’ capacities to effectively
comprehend and use TRI data (“receiver” problems).73
Beginning in 1998, the Environmental Defense Fund sponsored a private
website that provided a more user-friendly means of accessing TRI data.74 And,
as noted above, EPA now hosts its own more user-friendly tools for accessing
TRI data which are discussed in greater detail below.75 Fundamentally,
however, even when more readily available in user-friendly form, individuals
must still seek out TRI data. This presents a significant obstacle to
communicating TRI data to the public as “American consumers are not, in
general, information seekers. Only ten to twenty percent of Americans seek
information . . . . A risk communication program which requires active
information seeking by the consumer will reach only a small minority of the
intended audience.”76 One study of TRI revealed that “contrary to the
expectations that policymakers had for the TRI program, relatively few people
and community groups have made much direct use of the TRI data” and
“currently the [TRI] information is not reaching the public for one reason or
another.”77
The content of TRI data also frustrates efforts to position the public as an
audience for TRI data and to use TRI to advance individuals’ understanding of
toxics in their communities.
TRI fails to inform the public of the true extent of either toxic
releases or the toxic risks that they face. The most important
weaknesses are: (1) the failure to cover all sources of listed TRI
chemicals; (2) the failure to include in TRI all chemicals that
match or exceed the hazard posed by chemicals already listed;
and (3) the failure to characterize either the hazards or the risks
of TRI releases.78
This critique of TRI has been developed at length elsewhere.79 For present
purposes, the relevant point is that even when an individual seeks out or
encounters TRI data in a reasonably accessible format, the data may confuse
(because data about the volume of a chemical stored, disposed of or released
73. See generally Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 13, at 346–50 (describing source,
message, channel and receiver problems in risk communication).
74. Online “Chemical Scorecard” Puts Pollution on Display, supra note 51.
75. See supra notes 52–64 and accompanying text.
76. Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 13, at 353, 373 (encouraging policymakers to “seriously
consider the implications of risk communication research to create effective information disclosure
requirements in right-to-know programs.”) (internal citations omitted).
77. KRAFT, STEPHAN & ABEL, supra note 43, at 55, 136–37.
78. Pederson, supra note 72, at 164.
79. Id. at 165–74.
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often has little bearing on health or environmental impacts), mislead (because
similar or more pernicious chemicals or releases may not be included in the data
set because they do not fall within the TRI framework), or simply leave the
individual nonplussed (because the individual does not know what to make of
the mere presence of the release of particular chemicals in particular volumes)
about the nature and significance of toxic substances in their community.80
Finally, not only is information about the environmental and health impacts
of toxic releases complex (raising questions about whether individuals possess
the literacy necessary to comprehend the information),81 but the challenge of
educating or informing individuals through release of TRI information is
magnified because individuals receive and digest information in complicated
and often irrational ways. A rich body of social science, communications, and
psychology research provides insights into how individuals respond to
information, particularly as it relates to complex scientific information and risk,
and identifies a host of factors, ranging from reading literacy and numeracy to
cognitive biases and heuristics, that shape how individuals understand
information. 82 For example, the public is “much less sensitive than the experts
to fundamental considerations of dose and exposure,” “generally tend[s] to
view chemicals as either safe or dangerous, and [ ] appear[s] to equate even
small exposure to toxic or carcinogenic chemicals with almost certain harm.”83
Individuals tend to greatly fear risks to which they are involuntarily exposed,84
to overreact to small or low probability risks but to “react insufficiently to
changes in quantitative estimates of environmental harm . . . such as gallons of

80. There is no readily identifiable easy “fix” in terms of how to structure disclosure to educate
the public as a means to meaningfully inform individual choice about toxics exposure. Individuals
may lack the “sectoral literacy” and numeracy necessary to comprehend risk data; providing additional
information runs the risk of overload, and simplification (to avoid overload) would present distinct
challenges. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 26, at 55–137.
81. Id. at 79–93 (discussing how reading literacy, numeracy, and sectoral literacy can affect the
capacity of individuals to understand disclosures).
82. E.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY: THE 1996 ARNE RYDE MEMORIAL
LECTURES (1998); Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review,
14 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 501, 512–17 (summarizing literature addressed to environmental risk
perception and communication). See also Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 704–29 (2011) (describing characteristics and
proclivities of disclosees that prevent them from benefiting from disclosed information); Nordenstam
& DiMento, supra note 13; Anthony Patt & Richard Jeckhauser, Behavioral Perceptions and Policies
Toward the Environment, in JUDGMENTS, DECISIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 265 (Rajeev Gowda &
Jeffrey C. Fox eds. 2002).
83. Nancy Kraus, Torbjörn Malmfors & Paul Slovic, Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay
Judgments of Chemical Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 309 (Ragnar E. Löfstedt ed., 2000).
84. Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENV’T L. 887, 919 (1994).
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discharge or fractional concentrations,”85 to dismiss information that “creates
dissonance or internal conflict in their life,”86 and to apply preexisting cultural
belief systems to their interpretation of factual data.87 This research
demonstrates that care must be taken about how information is presented to
individuals—“[i]f information is not provided in a clear and usable form, it may
actually make people less knowledgeable than they were before.”88 However,
neither in its text nor in its implementation does TRI appear to incorporate these
insights into its mechanisms for communicating TRI data to the public.
This criticism should not be taken to suggest that TRI should or could be
expected to singlehandedly educate the public about nuanced aspects of
environment risk or consequence; there are likely outer bounds on the capacity
to use informational policy to educate individuals, in particular about
environmental risk.89 And even where individuals do not understand the nature
or extent of risks to the community posed by releases documented in TRI data,
that data may provide a basis for individuals to form an impression of relative
risk based on total volume of releases in their community as compared to
others.90 However, at present, TRI appears to simply “ensure[ ] that data are
available” while leaving the “burden . . . on the citizen to acquire, understand,
85. Patt & Zeckhauser, supra note 82, at 273–74.
86. Cross, supra note 84, at 912.
87. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 149, 170 (2006).
88. Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure and the First Amendment, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 653, 667–69 (1993) (describing difficulties arising from information processing,
heuristics, motivational bias, and overload).
89. John H. Sims & Duane D. Baumann, Educational Programs and Human Response to Natural
Hazards, 15 ENV’T AND BEHAV. 165, 182–83 (1983) (“Although clearly much can be accomplished
if the work is sophisticated and well informed, some acknowledgement should be made that it is
unrealistic to see the possibilities of hazard education and warning as unlimited. The weight of the
evidence is convincing that there are factors involved in determining public response that, practically
speaking, will continue to escape efforts at control.”). See also BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra
note 26, at 7 (arguing that mandated disclosure fails often “[e]xactly because the choices for which it
seeks to prepare disclosees are unfamiliar, complex, and ordinarily managed by specialists, [and
therefore] novices cannot master them with the disclosures that lawmakers usually mandate.”); id. at
47 (“The evidence does not say that no disclosure ever improves disclosees’ understanding. Many
studies show some improvements. But repeatedly even strenuous efforts to educate discloses do not
bring then near the level of understanding needed to make good decisions.”).
90. Archon Fung & Dara O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots
Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENV’T MGMT. 115,
120 (2000) (arguing that it is irrelevant that “ordinary people” cannot interpret TRI data because
“[s]omeone who lives next to a particularly noxious facility is concerned about relative, not absolute
risk. What they know is all they need to know; they suffer higher health risks from living next to one
of the worst polluters than others who live elsewhere. Even if that level of additional risk is low, it is
considered unjust and inequitable.”).
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and act upon the information.”91 Yet, TRI aims to “[p]rovide . . . [community
members] with information and insights regarding toxic chemical releases and
waste management practices in the community” so as to allow them to “[m]ake
informed decisions on the consequences of such practices and take action.”92
Where the “purpose of RTK is to allow citizens to make better decisions about
hazardous materials in the community,” “[t]his purpose requires not only that
information be available but that it be understandable and appropriate. Thus,
government may have to help citizens interpret or manipulate the data they
obtain in order to make it germane to community decisions, not just to ensure
its availability.”93
Even if the government itself does not perform these functions, it is of
course possible that TRI would have value in informing the public about toxics
if others stepped into the breach. Advocacy groups and the media can and do
serve as intermediaries helping to communicate TRI data to the public.94 By
serving this intermediary function, advocacy groups and the media can offset
the reality that most people will not independently seek out TRI data. Problems
may nonetheless persist about the content of the information provided and the
capacity of individuals to understand that information.95 Many news accounts
simply restate TRI data—relating the volume of release and reporting entity—
91. HADDEN, supra note 41, at 15 (characterizing this function as satisfying only “the most basic
purpose of [Right to Know].”).
92. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 61, at 3.
93. HADDEN, supra note 41, at 16.
94. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY IN ACTION: MEDIA,
GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, COMMUNITY AND ACADEMIC USES OF TRI DATA 4, 6–10 (2013). In a
presentation, Sarah Swenson, a Communications Specialist at the Office of Chemical Safety and
Pollution Prevention in the Environmental Protection Agency, commented that EPA does seek to reach
individuals with TRI data but that they “rely on information intermediaries very much.” U.S. EPA,
Toxics in the Community: Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) for Local and Tribal Governments, LGEAN
(Oct. 6, 2021), https://lgean.net/webinars.php [https://perma.cc/4ZTZ-TNYA]. Moreover, other
provisions of the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-Know-Act that require facilities to
disclose the presence of certain extremely hazardous substances to local emergency planning
committee who must then develop emergency response plans might also be expected to increase
community awareness of chemicals being used by local facilities. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11001–11002
(2021).
95. Indeed, advocacy groups and the media may not themselves understand the limitations and
significance of TRI data and, moreover, have incentives to characterize TRI to provoke public concern.
For a discussion of the motivations and behavior of public interest groups, including ways in which
they may sometimes depart from the interests of affected individuals, see Mark Seidenfeld,
Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration As the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 411, 466 (2000) (noting that large national or regional environmental groups often bring
and benefit financially from citizen suits under the Clean Water Act and observing that “citizen suits
that are brought by nonlocal environmental organizations actually undermine the empowerment of
local residents, who feel both the pinch of pollution and the impact of cutbacks in plant operation that
CWA enforcement might prompt.”).
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without providing much (if anything) in the way of context or explanation about
the meaning of those releases.96 And where an intermediary interprets the
underlying TRI data, the public’s understanding is then indexed to the filter of
that intermediary, including any biases or inaccuracies.97
b. Catalyst Results
Beyond being intended to inform the public as audience, TRI-required
disclosure is also meant to (and does) spur voluntary changes in the behavior
of some (upstream) covered entities, generating (on average) significant
reductions in the release of listed chemicals.98 The reasons for changes in the
behavior of TRI reporting entities are complex and not fully understood.99 The
96. E.g., Aaron Besecker, WNY Is Home to 7 of Top State Polluters, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Dec.
28, 2010, at B1, B2 (listing top “polluters” and, at most, noting the total volume of “waste” reported.
“Finch Paper in Glens Falls released nearly 3.8 million pounds of waste into the environment in 2009
and was the state’s biggest polluter, according to the data. Eastman Kodak’s Eastman Business Park
in Rochester ranked second in 2009, releasing more than 2.9 million pounds of waste.”). Of note, EPA
has recently engaged in outreach that seems designed to enlighten media reporting on TRI data, holding
training sessions for journalists. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, MEDIA ADVISORY: EPA TRAINING ON TOXIC
RELEASE INVENTORY FOR THE MEDIA (2014) (“The training will provide a brief overview of the TRI
program, discuss highlights of the most recent TRI data on toxic chemical releases and pollution
prevention activities, and illustrate how the public can use TRI tools to find out what releases are
occurring in the areas in which they live. The webinar is open to credential media only.”).
97. This, in turn, raises questions about the value of public response to TRI data as a means of
catalyzing upstream policy change that reflects public preference. See Seidenfeld, supra note 95, at
432 (discussing pathologies of interest group dynamics and observing that “although in theory
competition among groups for members should constrain against group leaders advocating extreme
positions that do not best serve the interests of members, in actuality imperfections in the ‘market’ for
interest representation may cause competition to exacerbate rather than mollify leaders’ extremist
tendencies” and that “imperfections in members’ decisions about whether to exit the group may induce
leaders to take extreme positions in order to generate publicity.”).
98. KRAFT, STEPHAN & ABEL, supra note 43, at 55 (reporting the results of an extensive study
of TRI’s effects and concluding that “on average facilities have indeed lowered the amount of their
toxic releases, but there is a quite varied pattern across the nation—both from state to state and from
one industrial facility to another.”). But see Volokh, supra note 12, at 814–38.
99. E.g., Mark A. Cohen, Information as a Policy Instrument in Protecting the Environment:
What Have We Learned?, 31 ENV’T L. REV. 10425, at 10425 (2001) (reviewing mechanisms that may
induce voluntary emissions reductions, including benchmarking, cooperation with regulators, and the
response of shareholders and lenders) (“Empirically it has been shown that mandatory disclosure
programs such as TRI can have a significant effect on the environmental performance of firms. What
is not fully understood, however, is the mechanism by which these programs induce firms to voluntarily
reduce emissions beyond any legal requirement.”); See also Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 294–331 (reviewing mechanisms by which TRI can
improve environmental performance, including self-monitoring, peer monitoring, empowering
regulators as monitors, community monitoring, informal regulation, and markets, and concluding that
“[g]iven the breadth, depth, and rapidity of reductions in TRI-monitored pollutants, the variety of
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information generated and disclosed through TRI can educate reporting entities
about their own releases and thereby motivate them to act to reduce the same;100
educate regulators and thereby help them to assess the adequacy of regulatory
action and the existence of regulatory gaps;101 empower more sophisticated
environmental nongovernmental organizations and community groups,
allowing them to exert pressure on emitters;102 and inform financial institutions
and investors, serving as an external signal of facility or organizational
health.103 An oft-offered explanation for why TRI-reporting entities voluntarily
reduce releases is that they are concerned about public reaction to disclosures
about releases,104 although the connection is hard to empirically demonstrate.105
Some firms have engaged in “anticipatory self-regulation” as a result of the
“bare possibility” that TRI information will prompt community action and a
demand for more stringent environmental regulation.106 In other words, the
mere possibility of public engagement with and response to TRI data may exert
an influence (and allow the public disclosure to serve as a catalyst influencing
upstream actions), even if, for the reasons described above, there is unlikely to
circumstances under which those improvements appear to have occurred, and the apparently
interlocking and mutually reinforcing character of the various strands of explanation, it seems far more
likely that causation is multiple, consisting of a number of interdependent elements that may
nonetheless be present in differing quantities from case to case.”). Other provisions of the EPCRA,
such as the requirement to engage in emergency planning with local communities, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 11001, 11002, and concerns related to terrorism may also exert an influence on corporate choices
decisions chemical use and releases.
100. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 94, at 5–6, 10.
101. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 310.
102. Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 90, at 118, 120–21.
103. Cohen, supra note 99, at 10425–26.
104. E.g., Volokh, supra note 12, at 815 (“Environmental information laws work in two ways:
they inform people of risks, and they work to change companies’ behavior (either because of public
pressure or because companies will preemptively change their processes to avoid having to face such
pressure).”); Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 90, at 120–21 (characterizing TRI as “populist maxi-min
regulation” where “pressure comes from ordinary people” and describing the public pressure created
by “environmental blacklisting” based on TRI data); Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation, supra note 2, at 316–23 (describing how TRI information can support informal regulation).
105. KRAFT, STEPHAN & ABEL, supra note 43, at 55 (identifying “regulation and concern about
potential financial liability” as having a stronger effect on chemical management decision than
community pressure, but arguing that “the TRI has had a greater impact than one might suppose, albeit
an indirect one that is related more to industry knowledge of its chemical releases and responses to
changing public expectations for corporate environmental behavior as well as the use of TRI data by
state and federal regulatory to improve their oversight of chemical management.”); id. at 40–41
(describing the mechanisms by which TRI information could cause facilities to take action in light of
anticipated community response); id. at 139–40 (explaining that even where media coverage and
resulting community concern about releases is episodic the threat may cause facilities to “preempt any
undesired attention through anticipatory performance in their toxic releases.”).
106. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation, supra note 2, at 309–12, 317.
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be a significant public reaction. Additionally, reporting entities are sometimes
responding to a hypothesized public reaction, one that they may well
understand has the potential to be uninformed and irrational in light of the
difficulties of communicating TRI data to the public as an audience.
In short, one interesting insight from applying this Article’s typology in the
TRI context is that TRI has positioned disclosure to the public as a catalyst for
upstream action, even though there is significant doubt about the extent to
which disclosure to the public, directly or indirectly (with the intervening
translating and publicizing efforts of intermediary advocacy groups or media),
achieves one of its core purpose: the use of disclosure to accurately inform the
broader lay public (as an audience) about toxics in the community. This raises
several interesting issues about use of information disclosure as a regulatory
strategy, which are revisited in Part IV.
B. Proposition 65
1. How Proposition 65 Works
In 1986, California voters approved Proposition 65 by ballot initiative.107
Proposition 65 requires, in relevant part, that “[n]o person in the course of doing
business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical
known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving
clear and reasonable warning to such individual.”108 The “Analysis by the
Legislative Analyst” for Proposition 65 that appeared in the California Ballot
Pamphlet for the November 4, 1986, general election explained that Proposition
65 would “require . . . businesses to warn people before knowingly and
intentionally exposing them to chemicals that cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity.”109
The measure identifies (and sets out a process for identifying) carcinogens
and reproductive toxins.110 The statute requires that warnings be “clear and
reasonable” and, as specified by regulation, a warning meets that requirement
“if the name of one or more of the listed chemicals in the consumer product or
affected area for which the warning is being provided is included in the text of

107. Proposition
65,
Cal.
Office
of
Env’t
Health
Hazard
Assessment,
https://oehha.ca.gov/proposition-65 [https://perma.cc/5HEX-LN6C].
108. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1987).
109. March Fong Eu, California Ballot Pamphlet: General Election November 4, 1986, 52
(1986), https://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1970&context=ca_ballot_pros
[https://perma.cc/RGT5-M2FQ].
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8 (West 1987). The updated list is available in the
Code of Regulations, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 27001 (2022).
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the warning.”111 The regulations go on to provide examples of warnings112 that
satisfy this standard in the context of consumer,113 environmental,114 and
occupational exposures.115
A warning meets the requirements of Proposition 65 for consumer exposure
if it contains specified elements:
(2) The word “WARNING:” in all capital letters and bold print,
and:
(A) For exposures to listed carcinogens, the words,
“This product can expose you to chemicals including
[name of one or more chemicals], which is [are]
known to the State of California to cause cancer. For
more information go to www.P65Warnings.ca.gov.”
(B) For exposures to listed reproductive toxicants, the
words, “This product can expose you to chemicals
including [name of one or more chemicals], which is
[are] known to the State of California to cause birth
defects or other reproductive harm. For more
information go to www.P65Warnings.ca.gov.”116
And a warning meets the requirements of Proposition 65 if it contains the
following elements:
(2) The word “WARNING:” in all capital letters and bold print.
(3) For exposures to listed carcinogens, the words, “Entering
this area can expose you to chemicals known to the State of
California to cause cancer, including [name of one or more
chemicals], from [name of one or more sources of exposure].
For more information go to www.P65Warnings.ca.gov.”
...
(4) For exposures to listed reproductive toxicants, the words,
“Entering this area can expose you to chemicals known to the
State of California to cause birth defects or other reproductive
harm, including [name of one or more chemicals], from [name
of one or more sources of exposure]. For more information go
to www.P65Warnings.ca.gov.”117

111. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25601 (2022).
112. These are considered safe harbors, in that warnings that comply with the examples provided
are deemed to satisfy the statutory requirement that the warning be clear and reasonable.
113. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25603 (2022).
114. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25605 (2022).
115. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25606 (2022).
116. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25603 (2022).
117. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25605 (2022).
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The Proposition 65 website118 provides information about Proposition 65
as well as some information about listed chemicals.119 Approved methods to
transmit a consumer product warning include a label on the product, “a posted
sign, shelf tag, or shelf sign, for the consumer product at each point of display
of the product,” and “[a] product-specific warning provided via any electronic
device or process that automatically provides the warning to the purchaser prior
to or during the purchase of the consumer product, without requiring the
purchaser to seek out the warning.”120 The approved methods to transmit an
environmental exposure warning are posting a sign in the affected area, mailing
a quarterly notice to occupants of the affected area, or issuing the warning
quarterly via public media announcements which target the affected area.121
The regulations further direct that environmental exposure warnings for indoor
or outdoor spaces must “[b]e provided in a conspicuous manner and under such
conditions as to make it likely to be seen, read, and understood by an ordinary
individual in the course of normal daily activity[,]” and reasonably associated
with the location and source of the exposure.122 The regulations also provide
guidelines for warnings tailored to specific products (such as alcohol) and
locations (such as dental offices).123
2. Purposes
Proposition 65 was intended to inform Californians about toxic risks so that
they could make their own decisions about exposure (audience).124 In addition,
the law was intended to motivate regulated entities to voluntarily make changes
to reduce public exposure (catalyst).125 In the section of the Ballot Pamphlet
offering the “Argument in Favor of Proposition 65,” the discussion included
the explanation that “Proposition 65 . . . tells businesses: Don’t expose us to
any of these same chemicals without first giving us a clear warning. We each

118. PROPOSITION
65
WARNINGS
WEBSITE,
www.P65Warnings.ca.gov
[https://perma.cc/XT5A-5K3C].
119. Id. For most listed chemicals there is very limited information provided, simply a notation
about the health harm (cancer or reproductive toxicity) and a brief indication of the reason for listing.
There are also, however, fact sheets providing more information about some listed chemicals.
120. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25602 (2022).
121. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25604 (2022).
122. Id.
123. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25607 (2022).
124. Paulette L. Stenzel, Right-to-Know Provisions of California’s Proposition 65: The Naivete
of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 493, 497 (1991).
125. Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 319 (“[B]eyond simply informing people, Proposition 65
was intended to provide a ‘compelling incentive’ for industry to remove nonessential carcinogens and
reproductive toxins from its products and processes.”).
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have a right to know, and to make our own choices about being exposed to these
chemicals.”126 In the words of one scholar:
In passing Proposition 65, Californians hoped to achieve at
least two interrelated objectives. First, the proposition was
designed to provide a more effective means for protecting the
public from toxics than the mechanisms already employed by
state and federal administrative agencies. A second objective,
which supplements the first, was to inform the public about
risks of everyday products. The drafters intended such
information to enable citizens to evaluate for themselves the
risks associated with the use of a particular product.
...
Proposition 65 purported to take a new approach to toxic
substance control by giving each individual, rather than
regulators, the power to choose which risks he or she would
each accept. Proposition 65 tries to establish a communication
mechanism for consumers to get the information required to
make decisions about product use. In addition to empowering
citizens, Proposition 65 attempts to use market pressures as an
alternative or a supplement to government regulation.127
Proposition 65’s purpose to “enable citizens to evaluate for themselves the
risks associated with the use of a particular product”128 shows how it positions
the public as an audience for disclosed information; its purpose to “use market
pressures . . . [to] supplement . . . government regulation”129 illustrates how it
seeks to use disclosure to the public as a catalyst for influencing the upstream
behaviors of regulated entities.
3. Results
a. Audience
By many accounts, Proposition 65 has had limited success in informing the
public as an audience for consumer and environmental (in this case, risk)
information.130 In the words of one commentator, “Proposition 65’s consumer
126. Id. at 318.
127. Stenzel, supra note 124, at 497–98 (internal citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 498.
130. E.g., Id. at 526 (“Proposition 65’s provisions cannot educate the public about risk in general,
nor provide information about specific risks that will enable citizens to make rational individual
decisions whether to accept or avoid those risks.”); Michael Barsa, California’s Proposition 65 and
the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1223, 1235 (1997) (“[I]nformation economics
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product, environmental, and occupational warnings have been of very limited
informational value. Many warnings go unnoticed, fail to inform the public
adequately about its exposure to listed chemicals, and fail to communicate
effectively the risk levels involved.”131 Criticisms of Proposition 65 consumer
product labels include that they are inconspicuously placed, employ ineffective
design and wording, do not provide a basis for evaluating the risk arising from
an exposure, fail to take account of risk communication research,132 and, as
compared to Proposition 65’s environmental exposure warnings, invite a
mistaken impression of (comparatively) elevated risk.133 Criticisms of
Propositions 65’s environmental exposure warnings include that they often go
unread because they are buried in the classified section of newspapers or are
otherwise inconspicuous, are worded in a manner that imparts little useful
information, and lack “explanatory information about the level or nature of risk
caused by exposures.”134 “Rather than warn, almost all environmental warnings
impart a message that is uninformative, personally irrelevant, and potentially
confusing to the reader.”135
Because of concerns of the type referenced above, the California Office of
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) engaged in regulatory
proceedings to change Proposition 65 regulations governing warning
requirements with the goal of “improving how the public is warned about
dangerous chemicals.”136 In its Pre-regulatory Draft Initial Statement of
Reasons, OEHHA conceded that:
[C]oncerns have been voiced for many years about the lack of
specificity in the current safe harbor warning
language . . . [and that] . . . [m]embers of the public currently
have no simple process for obtaining information about the
analysis suggests that Proposition 65 is a disaster”). For a critique of warning labels, generally, see
Cross, supra note 84, at 958–67. Even those who understand Proposition 65 to have some value at
communicating with individual consumers recognize that function is limited as compared to the impact
on businesses. Claudia Polsky & Megan Schwarzman, The Hidden Success of A Conspicuous Law:
Proposition 65 and the Reduction of Toxic Chemical Exposures, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 823, 839 (2020)
(arguing that “there are unquestionably instances in which particular warnings are salient to consumers
and promote personal autonomy vis-à-vis risk acceptance—the familiar concept of prior informed
consent” while recognizing the critiques of Proposition 65 warnings and emphasizing the law’s benefits
in influencing upstream business conduct).
131. Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 340.
132. Id. at 324, 326–30.
133. Viscusi, supra note 13, at 292.
134. Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at, 336.
135. Id. (emphasis omitted).
136. Press Release, Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor Brown Proposes to
Reform Proposition 65 (May 7, 2013).
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chemical(s) that are present, whether or how they are actually
being exposed to a significant amount of the chemical, the
specific toxic hazard (cancer or birth defects or other
reproductive harm[),] . . . or ways that they can reduce or
eliminate these exposures.137
OEHHA explained that a “key objective of the proposed regulation is to
provide consistent, understandable information concerning exposures to listed
chemicals.”138
OEHHA amended its regulations to require that safe harbor warnings
provide both on-label specificity about chemicals posing exposure risks and
links to off-label information.139 Additionally, the wording and presentation of
warnings have been changed in an effort to better communicate risk.140 For
example, instead of stating that a product “contains” a listed chemical, warnings
must now state that the product “can expose you” to a chemical known to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity.141
It remains to be seen whether or to what extent these changes will enhance
consumer comprehension and most of the critiques of Proposition 65’s
communication of risk pre-date the regulatory changes. Notably, however, the
OEHHA’s rulemaking is evidence of the widespread recognition that, while
Proposition 65 had sometimes powerful upstream catalyst effects, it has, to
date, been far less useful as a tool to educate the public as an audience.
b. Catalyst
Entities subject to Proposition 65’s warning requirement142 have voluntarily
changed products and practices to avoid issuing the required warning.143
137. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF ENV’T HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, PRE-REGULATORY DRAFT
INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS: TITLE 27, CALIFORNIA CODE OF REGULATIONS, ARTICLE 6 (Mar.
7,
2014),
http://oehha.ca.gov/prop65/warnings/pdf/ISORWarningreg030714.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P3RK-EL6U].
138. Id.
139. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25603 (2022).
140. Id.
141. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 27, § 25603 (2022).
142. The requirement applies to a “‘[p]erson in the course of doing business,’ [which] does not
include any person employing fewer than 10 employees in his or her business.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
27, § 25249.11(b) (2022).
143. PERCIVAL, SCHROEDER, MILLER & LEAPE, supra note 1, at 285; see also Proposition 65
Enforcement
Reporting
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
https://oag.ca.gov/prop65/faq
[https://perma.cc/9LPT-LG2F] (“Proposition 65 has motivated businesses to eliminate or reduce toxic
chemicals in numerous consumer products. Products that have been reformulated as a result of notices
of violation or litigation include ceramic tableware, artificial turf, household faucets, children’s
jewelry, potato chips, candy, and vitamin supplements.”). Proposition 65 contains a citizen suit

KUH_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

630

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:603

Although there are many questions about how much of this voluntary action
Proposition 65 prompts and the extent to which it in fact reduces risk,144
observers conclude that the disclosure required by Proposition 65 informs and
influences the behavior of at least some entities to which it applies due in part
to “industry concerns about liability and consumer reaction to warnings,”145
suggesting that Proposition 65’s disclosure to the public does serve as a catalyst
for upstream behavior.146 The adoption, implementation, and effects of
California’s Proposition 65 thus largely track the above-described experience
with TRI.147 Adopted to use public disclosure as a catalyst to influence private
commercial behavior and to inform the public as an audience, Proposition 65
shows some success in the former—at influencing the behavior of upstream
businesses and other private entities, but more limited value as the latter—as a
means of informing individuals.148
C. NEPA
Like TRI and Proposition 65, NEPA mandates information disclosure (in
this case, about the environmental impacts of federal action) in an effort to
provision that authorizes “any person in the public interest” to bring an action against persons violating
Proposition 65 after filing a notice of alleged violation and satisfying other requirements. CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 27, § 25249.7(d) (2022). Product reformulations are sometimes made in response to the
filing of a notice to sue under these provisions or after a lawsuit. PERCIVAL, SCHROEDER, MILLER &
LEAPE, supra note 1, at 285 (“Significant lawsuits continue to be brought under Proposition 65,
although many firms who received notice of an intention to sue have chosen to alter their practices so
as to avoid the need to produce warning labels.”). See also Polsky & Schwarzman, supra note 130, at
837 (documenting various instances of produce reformulation or reduced emissions in response to
Proposition 65 litigation).
144. PERCIVAL, SCHROEDER, MILLER & LEAPE, supra note 1, at 285 (“Fear of adverse consumer
reactions to warning labels has encouraged some manufacturers to reformulate their products to remove
carcinogens and reproductive toxins. . . . It is impossible to tell how frequently products have been
reformulated. While some companies have released products with ‘new formulas they can now tout
as safer—and sometimes even more effective . . . [o]ther companies are reformulating quietly to avoid
calling attention to chemicals in their old products.’”) (quoting Randolph B. Smith, California Spurs
Reformulated Products, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1990, at B1).
145. Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 341 (“Despite the prevalence of poor warnings,
Proposition 65’s warning requirement has stimulated significant consumer-product reformulation, due
to a combination of industry concerns about liability and consumer reaction to warnings.”).
146. Polsky & Schwarzman, supra note 130, at 841–83 (presenting the results of empirical work
demonstrating numerous ways that Proposition 65 shapes upstream business and regulatory decisions).
147. See supra Part III.A.3.
148. As discussed above, the distinction between positioning the public as an audience versus a
target is not always precise. While Proposition 65 provides information to individuals in part to inform
and enable changes in their behaviors (choices about risk exposure, consumer choices, perhaps even
civic behaviors), because it does not seek to persuade individuals and instead seeks to allow individuals
to express their own preferences, we would characterize it as positioning the public as an audience as
opposed to a target.

KUH_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

INFORMATIONAL REGULATION, ENVIRONMENT, & PUBLIC

631

inform the public as an audience and to influence upstream behavior (the
decision making of federal agencies and project applicants), thereby positioning
the public as a catalyst. And, as with TRI and Proposition 65, although NEPA
is subject to numerous criticisms, by most accounts it generally succeeds in
using disclosure as a catalyst for influencing (upstream) agency behavior and
decisions.149 However, NEPA, as with TRI and Proposition 65, has had more
limited utility for directly informing and engaging individuals as an audience
for environmental information.
1. How it Works
NEPA is intended to encourage federal agencies to consider environmental
issues as part of their decision-making processes. The Senate Report
accompanying NEPA observes that “[t]he cumulative influence of each
individual upon the environment is of such great significance that every effort
to preserve environmental quality must depend upon the strong support and
participation of the public,” and laments that “[p]ublic desires and aspirations
are seldom consulted” in the development of policy.150 The statute specifically
builds in opportunities for public engagement. NEPA includes the general
command that in interpreting and administering “the policies, regulations, and
public laws of the United States,” agencies shall “make available
to . . . individuals, advice and information useful in restoring, maintaining, and
enhancing the quality of the environment.”151 Further, NEPA provides that its
centerpiece requirement, preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) that discusses “the environmental impact” of proposed “major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,”152 “be
made available . . . to the public . . . .”153 Close examination of the legislative
history of NEPA supports the view that requiring the disclosure of information
to the public to allow for oversight of agency decisions was a central purpose
of the statute.154
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing
NEPA have long required public notice and comment as well. Prior to recent
149. Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 2, at 86 (“[W]hen all is said and done, it appears
that NEPA does in fact change the information environment in which agency decisions are made,
leading to environmentally salutary results.”).
150. S. REP. NO. 92-296, at 5, 19 (1969).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), (G).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
154. Brigham Daniels, Andrew P. Follett, James Salzman, Reconsidering NEPA, 96 IND. L.J.
865, 909 (2021) (“Rather than force action through research and findings alone, this section became a
means of policing agency actions with review by other sectors of government and the public.”).
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amendments, CEQ’s regulations,155 in describing the purposes of NEPA, noted
that “NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information is available
to . . . citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken” because
“public scrutiny [is] essential to implementing NEPA.”156 The regulations
exhorted agencies to “[i]mplement procedures to make the NEPA process more
useful to . . . the public” and to “[e]ncourage and facilitate public involvement
in decisions which affect the quality of the human environment.”157 The
regulations provided that “[a]fter preparing a draft environmental impact
statement and before preparing a final environmental impact statement the
agency shall . . . [r]equest comments from the public, affirmatively soliciting
comments from those persons or organizations who may be interested or
affected.”158 The regulations also instructed agencies to circulate both draft and
final EIS’s to any person upon request as well as to any person who has
submitted a substantive comment.159
In a 2010 Presidential Proclamation marking the fortieth anniversary of
NEPA, President Obama underscored NEPA’s focus on public involvement,
remarking that NEPA “emphasiz[es] public involvement to give all Americans
a role in protecting our environment” and reaffirming “NEPA’s role in
protecting public health, safety, and environmental quality, and in ensuring

155. CEQ’s regulations have been characterized as expanding NEPA’s emphasis on public
participation. Poisner, supra note 12, at 79 (“The evolution of NEPA’s citizen participation provisions
under the 1973 Guidelines and 1978 CEQ regulations . . . went far beyond the textual mandate of
NEPA.”). Notably, the CEQ regulations implementing NEPA were significantly amended in 2020,
Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020), although many of those changes were legally
challenged and CEQ has since proposed new rules, National Environmental Policy Act Implementing
Regulations Revisions, 86 Fed. Reg. 55757 (Oct. 7, 2021). This discussion cites to the pre-amendment
CEQ regulations in light of this uncertainty and also because the pre-amendment regulations accurately
reflect the orientation toward public involvement for much of NEPA’s history.
156. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2019). The regulations now provide that “[t]he purpose and function
of NEPA is satisfied if Federal agencies have considered relevant environmental information, and the
public has been informed regarding the decision-making process. . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2020).
157. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (2019).
158. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2019). Of note, these provisions remain the same in the new
regulations, which still require “affirmatively soliciting comments those persons or organizations who
may be interested in or affected.” 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2020). See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 6 (setting forth
EPA’s NEPA compliance regulations).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (2019). Of note, these requirements remain the same in the new
regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (2020). The regulations required (and continue to require) public
participation during scoping as well, the process by which an agency sets the boundaries and extent of
its environmental review, and upon the preparation of a draft EIS. 40 CFR §§ 1501.7, 1502.9, 1503
(2019); 40 CFR §§ 1501.9, 1502.9, 1503 (2020).
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transparency, accountability, and public involvement in our Government.”160
Courts that have interpreted NEPA have affirmed the statute’s goal of
informing the public and obtaining public input.161
2. Purposes
NEPA’s legislative history and its implementation indicate that NEPA is
intended to encourage agencies that are making decisions subject to the statute
to provide information to the public to educate it (audience function). For
example, in promoting transparency and accountability, NEPA is intended to
educate the public about the environmental consequences of different decisions.
This includes educating the public about alternative approaches to
implementing different types of projects (new roads, etc.) and the
environmental consequences of each.162
In addition, by providing the public with opportunities to participate at
various stages of the NEPA process, the statute seeks to allow the public to
serve as a catalyst to influence upstream behavior by project applicants and
agency decision-makers, and to equip them to provide input that will enrich that
decision-making (catalyst function).163 In terms of who or what is meant by the
“public” in this context—the lay public (individuals) or NGOs and other
interest groups—“environmental NGOs and other organized interest groups
typically play a far more prominent role in the NEPA process than does the
public at large” and some posit that this is consistent with NEPA’s purpose as
NEPA’s public disclosure requirement should be understood to reflect “a late
twentieth-century pluralist or interest group representation model.”164
160. Barack Obama, Presidential Proclamation—40th Anniversary of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 2010 WL 11179, at *1 (Jan. 4, 2010).
161. E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“In order to fulfill its role, the EIS must set forth sufficient information for the general public to make
an informed evaluation. . . . Only if such a document [EIS] is forthcoming can the public be
appropriately informed. . . .”); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“The apparent purpose of the ‘detailed statement’ is
to . . . aid . . . the public of the environmental consequences of planned federal action” and NEPA
“allows those removed from the initial process to evaluate and balance the factors on their own.”).
162. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., 449 F.2d at 1114.
163. Keith H. Hirokawa & Elizabeth J. Porter, Aligning Regulation with the Informational Need:
Ecosystem Services and the Next Generation of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 963, 970
(2013) (“Informational laws and regulations seek a variety of results, including the facilitation of a
more informed and participatory public and more informed decision makers, both of which could
operate to avoid poor natural resource decisions. NEPA, as an example of an informational law, was
initially adopted to insert a planning component into the normal progression of governmental decisionmaking.”) (citations omitted).
164. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward A Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 913 (2002).
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However, while it is true that NEPA often communicates to individuals through
these mediating groups, the text of the statute and CEQ’s implementing
regulations refer to “persons”165 and “individuals”166 as synonyms for the
public. And, as indicated in the preceding analysis, the way in which NEPA is
discussed and understood by political actors (“all Americans”167), actors in the
NEPA process (including lead agencies and CEQ), and interpreted by courts
(“In order to fulfill its role, the EIS must set forth sufficient information for the
general public to make an informed evaluation . . . ”168) all suggest that NEPA
is now generally understood as seeking to engage with the public at least in
addition to if not primarily as individuals (the lay public).
3. Results
a. Audience
While NEPA is credited with allowing “a new level of public information
and input into the environmental decision-making process,”169 a close
examination suggests that, as with TRI and Proposition 65, NEPA often fails to
communicate effectively with individuals. Many of the obstacles to public
engagement encountered with respect to the TRI program are likewise obstacles
to public education through NEPA. Only a subset of individuals will actively
seek out the information that NEPA is at pains to make publicly available—
“[f]ew citizens skim the Federal Register looking for proposed EISs that arouse
their interest.”170 Further, while agencies make efforts to notify and involve
affected communities,171 and NEPA information is now often readily available
online, even those who become aware of the availability of information

165. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1 (2019).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
167. Barack Obama, supra note 160, at 2.
168. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1034 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis
added).
169. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY
OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 18 (Jan. 1997). CEQ’s characterization of public
information and input as “the extent to which an agency takes into account the views of the surrounding
community and other interested members of the public during its planning and decision-making
process” reflects Congress’s intent that the public play a catalyst role. Id. at 17.
170. Poisner, supra note 12, at 91.
171. EPA’s NEPA regulations, for example, instruct the agency to use “reasonable efforts to
involve the potentially affected communities.” 40 C.F.R. § 6.203 (2020). Some agencies do engage
in creative outreach; the Bureau of Reclamation, for example, has product YouTube videos to engage
the public with environmental reviews. See, e.g., Bureau of Reclamation, Boise River Basin Feasibility
Study—Proposed
Action,
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
5,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ST_k0zdHlQ [https://perma.cc/M72D-3NXV].
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required to be disclosed under NEPA are likely to struggle to understand the
process and information that is provided.
The chief information product of NEPA’s process, the EIS, often comprises
hundreds to thousands of pages of “information presented in a technically
unintelligible format.”172 Scholars observe that “the heavy emphasis on
scientific analysis makes it difficult for lay citizens to engage in meaningful
dialogue regarding EIS substance.”173 Indeed, one study that gave subjects the
project description portion of an EIS and then tested their comprehension of
that material found that subjects did not adequately understand the proposed
project’s basic features or its likely environmental effects; in fact, many
subjects who read the EIS understood no more about the project than
individuals who had not read the EIS.174 A CEQ study seems to acknowledge
the impenetrability of NEPA documents and the difficulties individuals
experience in connection with the NEPA process.175 It reveals that “[c]itizens
report that they often feel overwhelmed by the resources available to
proponents and agencies.”176 In its Citizens Guide to the NEPA, which “was
developed to explain the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), how it is
implemented, and how people outside the Federal government—individual
citizens, private sector applicants, members of organized groups, or
representatives of Tribal, State, or local government agencies—can better
participate in the assessment of environmental impacts conducted by Federal
agencies,”177 CEQ essentially advises individuals navigating NEPA to obtain
expert guidance:
Being active in the NEPA process requires you to dedicate
your resources to the effort. Environmental impact analyses
can be technical and lengthy. Active involvement in the NEPA

172. Poisner, supra note 12, at 86, 90. See also Nicholas A. Fromherz, From Consultation to
Consent: Community Approval as a Prerequisite to Environmentally Significant Projects, 116 W. VA.
REV. 109, 137 (2013) (“Those who have repeatedly engaged in the [EIA] process know two things: (1)
it is not user-friendly, and (2) many comments seem to fall on deaf ears. EISs typically range from 200
to more than 2,000 pages in length . . . . [T]hey invite review by experts and attorneys, not lay
persons.”) (internal citations omitted).
173. Poisner, supra note 12, at 86.
174. William C. Sullivan, Frances E. Kuo & Mono Prabhu, Assessing the Impact of
Environmental Impact Statements on Citizens, 16 ENV’T IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 176–78 (1996).
175. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, supra note 169 (“At the same time that some citizens feel
unable to participate effectively in the NEPA process, agencies have expressed concern about the
difficulty of obtaining constructive input from the public (and other federal and state agencies) early
in the planning and scoping process.”).
176. Id.
177. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR VOICE
HEARD 30 (Dec. 2007).
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process requires a commitment of time and a willingness to
share information with the decisionmaking agency and other
citizens. . . . Another way to participate is to check with local
experts such as biologists or economists at a university to assist
with your review of the NEPA analyses and documents. You
can also form study groups to review environmental impact
analyses and enlist experts to review your comments on the
documents.178
Individuals do engage with the NEPA process—it is not uncommon for
agencies to receive thousands (even hundreds of thousands) of public
comments during the NEPA process.179 However, interest groups often filter
the information that individuals receive and guide individuals’ comments:
In practice, environmental NGOs and other organized interest
groups are usually much better situated than the public at large
to exploit NEPA’s public comment process. Thus once again,
NEPA’s procedural reforms appear to do more to advance
interest group pluralism than direct democracy. . . . [I]t
appears that relatively little NEPA-generated information is
transmitted unfiltered from government to the citizenry and
back again. Far more frequently, organized groups serve as a
mediating agent, repackaging and translating the often highly
technical information contained in an EIS for dissemination to
the broader citizenry, and offering their services as the vehicle
through which citizens may attempt to hold their government
accountable.180
The thousands of public comments agencies receive often take the form of
interest group-authored and solicited form letters.181 One scholar observes that
“citizen participation [in NEPA] tends to occur indirectly through groups.”182
178. Id. at 23.
179. In addition to submitting written comments to formal NEPA documents (FONSI, DEIS,
EIS, SEIS), individuals may participate in public hearings as part of the NEPA process. Critiques of
the format and content of these hearings suggest that they often likewise fail to promote understanding
of disclosed information. Poisner, supra note 12, at 86.
180. Karkkainen, supra note 164, at 914–16.
181. E.g., Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions; Environmental Review Process for Fishery
Management Actions, 73 Fed. Reg. 27998 (May 14, 2008) (“NMFS received a total of 1,660
comments, all but 8 of which were form letters . . . .”); Notice of Availability of a Draft Environmental
Impact Statement (DEIS) for New Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Notice of Public
Hearing, 73 Fed. Reg. 37922 (July 2, 2008) (“NHTSA received 1,748 comment letters in response to
its scoping notices. NHTSA received 11 individual letters commenting on the scope of its NEPA
analysis from federal and state agencies, automobile trade associations, environmental organizations,
and individuals. The remaining comment letters are form letters from individuals.”). See also Poisner,
supra note 12, at 91.
182. Poisner, supra note 12, at 91.
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In short, intermediaries often shape public access to, understandings of, and
responses to information disclosed under NEPA. That role seems to be one that
CEQ acknowledges and accepts.183
Thus, while some NEPA information does make its way to individuals and
some input from individuals does make its way back to agencies, that
information is often simplified, mediated by interest groups, and of uncertain
value in educating the public about a project. Numerous scholars have offered
withering critiques of the quality of public participation in the NEPA process.184
Pulling again from an established literature, it seems fair to characterize NEPA
as having had limited success in engaging the public (defined as lay individuals)
as an audience for environmental information.
b. Catalyst
In contrast, as noted above, the disclosure and processes mandated by
NEPA have influenced many agency decisions185 and it seems clear that NEPA,
183. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, supra note 169, at 5 (defining the public to include “any
entity outside the federal government, including (1) academicians, (2) nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), (3) citizens, and (4) businesses . . . .” In soliciting “public advice” for its report, the CEQ
hosted “meetings with NGOs,” “a survey of businesses, and a survey of academicians,” as well as
undertaking a “citizen survey.”). Id. Reliance on intermediaries has significant implications. See
Seidenfeld, supra note 95 (discussing distinctions in motivation and otherwise between and among
these different parts of the public).
184. E.g., Jeremy Firestone, Christine Hirt, David Bidwell, Meryl Gardner & Joseph Dwyer,
Fairing Well in Offshore Wind Power Siting? Trust, Engagement and Process Fairness in the United
States, 62 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2020); 3 Jeremy Firestone, Ben Hoen, Joseph Rand, Debi
Elliott, Gundula Hübner & Johannes Pohl, Reconsidering Barriers to Wind Power Projects:
Community Engagement, Developer Transparency and Place, 20 J. ENV’T POL’Y & PLAN. 370 (2018);
Fromherz, supra note 172, at 136–37; Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of
Environmental Decisions: Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions Through Partnership with
Experts and Agents, 27 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 151, 206 (2010) (“In this environment, citizen testimony
exists without effect, and neither constitutes a successful element of democracy nor serves the purpose
of legitimization.”); Poisner, supra note 12, at 55 (“NEPA citizen participation generates more heat
than light, creating citizen participation pathologies that leave both citizens and agencies frustrated by
the process.”); Fiorino, supra note 82, at 526 (“Although NEPA may have been important in promoting
substantive democratic values, I argue that it did not promote the procedural values of democracy. It
reinforced a conception of participation as confrontation and opposition. It strengthened the reliance
on litigation as a political tool. It established the precedent for elaborate written documentation that
became ‘an instrument of legal and political warfare.’”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
185. ROBERT
G.
DREHER,
NEPA
UNDER
SIEGE
4–7
(2005),
https://www.sierraforestlegacy.org/Resources/Conservation/LawsPoliciesRegulation/ForestPlanning
Regulations/NEPA/NEPA-UnderSiege.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KNV-LRDZ] (listing projects and
outcomes influenced by the NEPA process); ENV’T L. INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING
40 YEARS OF TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT (2010), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/getinvolved/NEPA_Success_Stories.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNU6-8BKJ] (providing a series of case
studies illustrating NEPA’s impact).
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despite not compelling a substantive outcome, serves as a catalyst to influence
agency behavior and decision making.186 Commentators offer different
explanations for how NEPA serves this catalyst function. Disclosure and public
participation can sometimes generate new information that educates
agencies.187 Agencies, anticipating the need to publicly explain and justify
actions, may decline to put forward indefensible projects.188 And the prospect
of judicial review may encourage agencies to develop better information about
environmental impacts and to more carefully consider alternatives.189
An extensive literature explores, and offers different conclusions about, the
normative value of the NEPA process, including its mandated public
disclosures.190 Criticisms range from pointing out how agencies may
strategically navigate NEPA’s requirements in ways that defeat the purpose of
disclosure (for example, by producing complex analyses designed to provide
litigation-proof support for predetermined courses of action as opposed to
exploring impacts and soliciting input191) to questioning whether the costs of
186. PERCIVAL, SCHROEDER, MILLER & LEAPE, supra note 1, at 893–97 (summarizing
assessments of NEPA’s performance).
187. ENV’T L. INST., supra note 185, at 6.
188. DREHER, supra note 185, at 6 (“NEPA’s most significant effect has been to deter federal
agencies from bringing forward proposed projects that could not withstand public examination and
debate.”).
189. See ENV’T L. INST., supra note 185, at 7.
190. E.g., Karkkainen, supra note 164, at 917 (“NEPA in practice turns out to be a less elegant,
efficient, and effective engine for producing and transmitting information than its proponents
suppose.”).
191. COUNCIL ON ENV’T QUALITY, supra note 169, at iii (“[T]his NEPA Effectiveness Study
finds that agencies may sometimes confuse the purpose of NEPA. Some act as if the detailed statement
called for in the statute is an end in itself, rather than a tool to enhance and improve decisionmaking . . . . The Study finds that agencies sometimes engage in consultation only after a decision has
— for all practical purposes — been made . . . . This may in turn lead to agencies seeking ‘litigationproof’ documents, increasing costs and time but not necessarily quality.”). Other critiques about
strategic manipulation of the NEPA process include the use of mitigated FONSIs to avoid EIS
preparation and the absence of adequate post-approval monitoring of project implementation. Ronald
Bjorkland, Monitoring: The Missing Piece: A Critique of NEPA Monitoring, 43 ENV’T IMPACT
ASSESSMENT REV. 129, 130–31 (2013) (noting that agencies are not required to incorporate monitoring
into the NEPA process and rarely do, and suggesting that monitoring a project during all phases of the
NEPA processes would provide a much needed “scorecard” of NEPA performance); Karkkainen,
supra note 164, at 933 (noting that mitigated FONSIs offer an opportunity for the agency to avoid
triggering an EIS by incorporating mitigation measures into the project; however, mitigated FONSIs
and EAs are not reported and are not tracked, so there is little detailed information on the number and
kinds of mitigated projects). See also Larry Canter & Ray Clark, NEPA Effectiveness—A Survey of
Academics, 17 ENV’T IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 313, 317 (1997) (concluding that, based on a study
of NEPA academics to determine the strengths and weaknesses of NEPA, the concern of greatest
importance to the academics was that “post project monitoring for mitigation and evaluation is rarely
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NEPA compliance (time, expense, delays, the potential for NIMBY efforts to
use the NEPA process to derail sound projects) justify the benefits.192 Few,
however, would question that—whether for good or bad— NEPA significantly
influences agency behavior and decision making, suggesting that disclosure
serves as a powerful catalyst.
D. Eco-labelling
Eco-labels also constitute informational regulation.193 As described in
greater detail below, eco-labels can be understood to position the public in
different roles—as an audience for product information to inform consumer
choice; as a target, if the goal is to change consumer purchasing behavior; and
as a catalyst to change the upstream choices made by commercial entities.
Interestingly, as illustrated through an analysis of organic food labeling, there
is some evidence that, as in the case of TRI, Proposition 65, and NEPA, ecolabeling may struggle to educate consumers despite its capacity to influence
consumer and producer behaviors.
1. How It Works
Eco-labels communicate attributes about a product or the process by which
it is produced and can advise the consumer about both private benefits that
accrue directly to the consumer (the potential health benefits of avoiding
exposure to certain chemicals, the “warm glow” of knowing one has chosen a
product with reduced environmental impact) and public benefits that accrue
more broadly (the broader environmental benefits of aggregated
environmental-friendly consumer choices, e.g., the long term environmental
benefits of reduced pesticide use).194 Under the theory of eco-labelling:
[L]abels may cause consumers to place a higher value on
‘environmentally superior’ products and . . . firms might react
to this change in consumer preferences by improving the
conducted.”). The lack of information about project implementation, in particular with respect to
mitigated FONSIs, might thus be viewed as raising questions about the efficacy of the ex ante catalyst
role of citizens.
192. Karkkainen, supra note 164, at 905 (observing that “[f]rom the critics’ vantage point, NEPA
appears to demand burdensome procedural formalities while accomplishing little or nothing of
substance.”); Linda Luther, CRS Report for Congress, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
STREAMLINING NEPA at CRS-2-3 (2007) (summarizing concerns about NEPA implementation that
motivate a desire to streamline its provisions), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33267.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HDR5-E9BK].
193. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 6, a 157 (listing eco-labels as an example of informational
regulation).
194. Margot J. Pollans, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for Sustainable
Organics, 85 N.Y.U. REV. 621, 646–47 (2010).
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environmental quality of their products. . . . [Information
provision may also lessen environmental damage by]
allow[ing] consumers with preferences for environmentally
superior goods to alter their consumption in accordance with
these preferences, reducing the consumption of
environmentally inferior goods and increasing the
consumption of environmentally superior goods. Thus, one
might argue that environmental labels have the potential to
open a second front in the regulation of environmental
externalities—not only inducing manufacturers to produce
cleaner products or employ cleaner processes, but also
inducing consumers to purchase more of the cleaner products
and less of the others.195
Some eco-labeling appears to influence consumer behavior,196 although
many questions remain about whether, how, and why eco-labels influence
consumers and, in turn, firm behavior. An extensive body of research explores
consumer response to eco-labels.197 Where the requirements to obtain an ecolabel require firms to change processes and as a result charge higher prices for
a good,198 that price increase may temper consumer response.199 The nature of
the source (government, private third party) that offers or certifies the label,
whether the source’s contact information is listed, the level of detail of
information provided on the label, and numerous other aspects of label design

195. Russell & Clark, supra note 1, at 114–15.
196. Christopher D. Clark & Clifford S. Russell, Public Information Provision as a Tool of
Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 112 (Signe
Krarup & Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005) (summarizing studies suggesting that “environmental labels
have prompted changes in consumer behaviour.”); Russell, Krarup & Clark, supra note 11, at 8
(observing that while “[e]mpirical evidence on whether or not consumers are actually willing to
incorporate environmental information into their consumption decisions is still scarce . . . the very
existence of green products and the accompanying ‘green advertising’ imply that companies (or at least
their marketing departments) believe that consumers are willing to consider environmental issues when
making purchasing decisions.”).
197. E.g., ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS (1994).
198. John M. Crespi & Stephan Marette, Eco-Labelling Economics: Is Public Involvement
Necessary?, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR 94 (Sign Krarup &
Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005) (“[E]co-labels aim at increasing profits by attracting environmentally
responsible consumers who are willing to pay a premium in order to support a costlier production
process.”).
199. Id. at 98 (reporting that “very few consumers are ready to pay more than 5–10 per cent
compared to the price of a standard product” and “the niche eco market is likely to be a stable one even
if it is small.”). But see supra notes 195–97 and accompanying text (evidencing growth in the market
for organic goods).
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can all impact consumer response.200 It is clear that cognitive biases and other
interpretation challenges can influence consumer response to labels and that
labels can readily be misunderstood;201 it is also clear that decisions about what
product attributes labels communicate significantly impact the potential
environmental benefits associated with labeling schemes and disputes abound
about what information labels should capture to maximize their environmental
benefits.202 Overall, the efficacy of eco-labels, the precise mechanisms by
which they function, and their normative value remain somewhat uncertain.203
For present purposes, what is most relevant is that eco-labels have the
potential to position the public in all three capacities that we discuss in this
Article—as an audience, target, or catalyst.204 By informing “conscientious
consumers” as an audience, eco-labels can support personal autonomy by
allowing consumers to match consumption decisions to personal preference.205
In addition, eco-labels can be used to promote greater consumer uptake of
environmentally-friendly products (target) and to encourage upstream
producers to adopt processes and sell products that match consumer preferences
(catalyst).206 Russell, Krarup, and Clark explain that, by providing information
about the environmental attributes of a product or company, eco-labels may
200. Mario F. Teisl & Brian Roe, Evaluating the Factors that Impact the Effectiveness of EcoLabelling Programmes, in ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR, at 74–83
(Signe Krarup & Clifford S. Russell eds., 2005).
201. Jason J. Czarnezki, K. Ingemar Jonsson & Katrina Kuh, Crafting Next Generation EcoLabel Policy, 48 ENV’T L. 409, 431 (2018) (explaining how eco-label design can influence consumer
understanding and behavior); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 82, at 675–76 (describing studies
illustrating consumer difficulty interpreting and applying mandated nutrition labels); Howard Latin,
“Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1198, 1206–41
(1994).
202. E.g., CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 80–83 (suggesting improvements to the design of food
labels).
203. Russell & Clark, supra note 1, at 113 (“[W]hile we know that some consumers are willing
to pay more for goods labelled as environmentally friendly, we do not know why.”) (emphasis
omitted); id. at 135 ( “The framework proffered in this chapter has been used to show that there is no
general, theoretic basis for concluding that the ability of environmental labelling to influence both
product design and production processes and consumer choice of competing products holds more
promise as a means of achieving static efficiency than more traditional market-based environmental
policy instruments.”).
204. Notably, as with TRI, some suggest that eco-labels can also change producer behavior
simply by providing information to businesses regardless of the reaction of consumers. Orts, supra
note 2, at 1272 (characterizing environmental labels as “strongly reflexive” and observing that they
attempt to “generate internal self-reflective processes within business.”). “The reflexive aim is not to
constrain or dictate behavior, but rather to provide mechanisms or structures to increase the amount of
self-reflection and social communication concerning serious environmental issues.” Id. at 1268.
205. CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 74–75.
206. Russell, Krarup & Clark, supra note 11 at 7–8.
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cause individuals to “alter their consumption patterns” and “[t]o the extent that
consumers do so, or to the extent that firms alter their product design or
production methods in response to, or in anticipation of, such actions, then
consumer action, or the threat of consumer action actually induces the change
in polluter behaviour . . . .”207 Eco-labels can thus educate the public and
thereby support informed consumer choice (public as audience), provide
information to encourage the public to purchase environmentally-superior
goods (public as target), and influence the practices of producers (public as
catalyst for changes in upstream behavior).208
There are many types of eco-labels, including voluntary and private
labeling regimes; evaluating eco-labels as a form of informational regulation,
however, suggests a focus on government supported or mandated eco-labels.209
A review of the experience with the National Organic Program’s USDA
Organic Seal implemented under the Organic Foods Production Act, one of the
most prominent domestic eco-label protocols, provides a useful foil to evaluate
the use of government eco-labels.210
The Organic Foods Production Act establishes a nationally uniform
labeling program for organic products and provides that for an agricultural
207. Id. at 5.
208. Although EPA did not use the same terms, it aptly described these various functions of ecolabels in a 1994 report:
As a provider of independent product endorsement, a labeling program can offer
companies a selling point that is more credible than the manufacturers’ own
claims. As a consumer protection tool, labeling can provide product information
that is not readily apparent or easily discerned . . . . As a policy instrument,
labeling can influence marketplace behavior, guiding consumers and
manufacturers to act in ways that further public policy goals.
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION
AND LABELING PROGRAMS, 8 (1994). Notably, “not all consumers in a market need to be affected by
the information programme to alter markets; only a subset of consumers need to respond to the
information to impact producer behaviours.” Teisl & Roe, supra note 200, at 65. See also Christine
Moorman, Firm Responses to Consumer Information Policy, 120, in HANDBOOK OF MARKETING AND
SOCIETY 120 (2001) (“What remains interesting about the impact of consumer behavior on competitive
activity is the view that not all consumers in relevant markets need to change their search and choice
behaviors. Instead, only a subset of ‘activist’ consumers need to respond to the information.”). There
is also a possibility that producers overestimate the impact of disclosure on consumers, the “tell-tale
heart” effect. George Loewenstein, Cass R. Sunstein & Russell Golman, Disclosure: Psychology
Changes Everything, 6 ANN. REV. ECON. 391, 396 (2014).
209. CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 42–44, 74, 82 (describing different eco-label systems); ENV’T
PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL LABELING: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES WORLDWIDE
(1998) (surveying eco-label systems). Proposition 65 consumer exposure warnings, discussed above
in our analysis of the Proposition 65 program, are a form of eco-label.
210. 7 U.S.C § 6501(2)–(3). The Energy Star label is another well-established U.S. governmentsponsored eco-label. CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 42–43 (describing the Energy Star program).
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product to be sold or labeled as organic (using the USDA Organic Seal) it must
“have been produced and handled without the use of synthetic chemicals” and
in accordance with an organic plan.211 Although there are numerous specific
requirements for obtaining and using one of the Act-approved organic labels,212
core requirements include that products are not irradiated or genetically
modified,213 crops are not (directly) sprayed with pesticides,214 healthy
livestock are not treated with antibiotics or growth hormones,215 and livestock
living conditions meet a minimum standard.216 The USDA Organic Seal
signifies that a product meets the requirements of the National Organic
Program.217 Some consumers and others would prefer different, and in some
cases, more comprehensive, requirements.218 The label does not communicate
performance regarding numerous other environmental attributes of labelled
products, such as carbon intensity,219 nor does it make a representation
regarding the food safety or nutritional value of labeled products.220
2. Purposes
The Organic Foods Production Act was adopted inter alia “to assure
consumers that organically produced products meet a consistent standard” and
“to facilitate interstate commerce in fresh and processed food that is organically
produced.”221 Because the National Organic Program does not purport to
recommend or promote products bearing the USDA Organic Seal and instead
embodies an effort to avoid consumer confusion about the environmental
attributes of labeled products, the Program’s primary aim appears to situate the

211. 7 U.S.C § 6504(1), (3).
212. For the USDA’s regulations implementing the statute, see the National Organic Program,
C.F.R. § 205.100 (2021).
213. 7 C.F.R. § 205.105 (2021); 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2021) (“Excluded methods. A variety of
methods used to genetically modify organisms or influence their growth and development by means
that are not possible under natural conditions or processes and are not considered compatible with
organic production. Such methods include cell fusion, microencapsulation and macroencapsulation,
and recombinant DNA technology (including gene deletion, gene doubling, introducing a foreign gene,
and changing the positions of genes when achieved by recombinant DNA technology).”).
214. 7 C.F.R. § 205.206 (2021).
215. 7 C.F.R. § 205.238(c) (2021).
216. 7 C.F.R. § 205.239 (2021).
217. Jason J. Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic, Carbon Footprint, and
Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 3, 16 (2011).
218. Id. at 48.
219. Id. at 30–31.
220. USDA, USDA OVERSIGHT OF ORGANIC PRODUCTS (2012) (“The USDA organic
regulations do not address food safety or nutrition.”). See also CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 71.
221. 7 U.S.C. § 6501(2)–(3).
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public as an audience for information about the environmental attributes of
products bearing the USDA Organic Seal in order to support informed
consumer choice. The National Organic Program also expressly situates the
public as a catalyst but for a quite limited purpose—to promote upstream
uniformity in organic practices to facilitate interstate commerce in organic
goods.222 While individual producers may hope that the Program operates as a
target mechanism by encouraging consumers to change their purchasing
behaviors to purchase more USDA Organic Seal-labelled products, increasing
the purchase of organic products is not a stated policy aim. Similarly, although
supporters of organic foods may value the Seal for its potential to prompt more
environmentally-friendly upstream practices in food production (public as
catalyst), that is not an express purpose of the law.
3. Results
The National Organic Program has had a significant impact both with
respect to situating the public as a target (influencing purchasing behavior) and
a catalyst (prompting more upstream producers to adopt practices consistent
with the requirements to obtain the Seal). The market for organic products is
robust. U.S. sales of organic products rose to nearly $62 billion in 2020 and
organic food sales grew faster than conventional food sales.223 The USDA
organic label appears to be influencing both consumer and producer behaviors
in ways consistent with the theory of eco-labelling.224 Notably, these target and
catalyst outcomes—increased purchases of organic products and growing the
organics industry—are not those adopted by the statute. The growth in the
organics industry suggests, however, that the statute’s narrower catalyst goals
of inducing uniformity and facilitating interstate commerce in organic goods
are also being met, although it should be noted that there is enormous debate

222. Id.
223. Russell Redman, Organic Food Sales Jump Nearly 13% To Record High in 2020,
SUPERMARKET NEWS (May 25, 2021), https://www.supermarketnews.com/produce-floral/organicfood-sales-jump-nearly-13-record-high-2020 [https://perma.cc/ZV3L-ANVP] (reporting on data from
the Organic Industry Report 2021); CAROLYN DIMITRI & CATHERINE GREENE, RECENT GROWTH
PATTERNS IN THE U.S. ORGANIC FOODS MARKET (2002); USDA Economic Research Service, Organic
Market
Summary
and
Trends,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resourcesenvironment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-summary-and-trends [https://perma.cc/6D2PK4Z7].
224. USDA, USDA Reports Record Growth in U.S. Organic Producers, $1 Billion in USDA
Investments Boost Growing Markets for Organic Products and Local Foods, Release No. 084-16 (Apr.
4, 2016) (reporting a significant increase in the number of certified organic operations).
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about whether the producer practices and resulting organics industry supported
by the Seal are normatively desirable.225
The USDA Organic Seal has been notably less effective at situating the
public as an audience. The Seal appears to be influencing consumer and
producer behavior even though there is widespread confusion amongst
consumers about the meaning and function of the label.226 In one study, cookies
labeled as organic were perceived to be more nutritious and have fewer calories;
other studies have revealed that some consumers mistakenly believe that
organic signifies local and that many concede that they simply don’t know what
organic means.227 Indeed, one scholar observes that the above-described
confusion may explain the apparent success of organic labels: “[I]t may be that
the recent success of organic labels can be attributable to their ability to
represent different things to different people.”228 “Individuals buy organic
products to promote sustainable and chemical-free agriculture [(public
benefit)], as well as to keep their bodies free of synthetics and pesticides
[(private benefit)].”229 Considerable research suggests that consumers are
motivated to buy organic products primarily because of perceived (private)
health benefits, as opposed to public (environmental) benefits.230 Yet, those
225. E.g., Megan S. Houston, Ecolabel Programs and Green Consumerism: Preserving A
Hybrid Approach to Environmental Regulation, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 225, 240–41 (2012),
and CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 71–73.
226. Houston, supra note 225, at 240 (“Many [mistakenly] believe the organic label means that
the product is free from residual amounts of banned products that unintentionally contaminated the
product, that buying organic products supports small farms, that organic farms are local farms, or that
organic livestock promotes animal welfare.”); Pollans, supra note 194, at 644 (citing studies and
observing that “[c]onsumers also have insufficient knowledge about the meaning of the current organic
label and the environmental impacts of organic farming. Many consumers unjustifiably believe that
organic foods are better for the environment and have substantial health benefits.”) (internal citations
omitted). See also CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 72 (“For many, the organic label means healthy,
environmentally friendly, safe, and pesticide free. While in some cases these characteristics are true,
they are not elements of the legal definitions of organic.”).
227. Joe Pinsker, Millennials Like ‘Organic’–Even If They Have No Idea What It Means,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 23, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/11/millennials-likeorganiceven-if-they-have-no-idea-what-it-means/383006/ [https://perma.cc/D4L8-CM9D].
228. Russell, Krarup & Clark, supra note 11, at 14.
229. CZARNEZKI, supra note 2, at 71.
230. Pollans, supra note 194, at 646–47 (“Although consumer studies find that strong
environmental concerns do correlate with willingness to pay higher prices for organic foods,
environmental interests fall far behind the other motivating values of health, including safety and
nutrition, taste, and price. Health is consistently identified as the primary factor.”) (internal citations
omitted). Ramu Govindasamy, Marc DeCongelio & Sanjib Bhuyan, An Evaluation of Consumer
Willingness To Pay for Organic Produce in the Northeastern U.S., J. FOOD PRODS. MKTG., Jan. 2006,
at 3, 4; Renée Shaw Hughner, Pierre McDonagh, Andrea Prothero, Clifford J. Shultz II & Julie Stanton,
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perceived private health benefits are disputed231 and, moreover, are not an
attribute that the USDA Organic Seal purports to advance (at least not
directly).232 Awareness of the mismatch between the consumer beliefs
underlying “organic” purchases and what the USDA Organic Seal signifies has
led to backlash,233 including allegations that organic marketers have
purposefully encouraged public association of organic with healthy.234
From the perspective of interface with the public, then, the experience with
eco-labeling through the National Organic Program seems to parallel the
experience with TRI, NEPA and Proposition 65 in that public information
disclosure through the USDA Organic Seal program has influenced public
(consumer) and upstream (in this case market) behaviors, but has been
somewhat less effective in its audience function of using disclosure to
meaningfully inform choice. Providing the public with information in the form
of the USDA Organic Seal serves a clear instrumental end—it has shaped
consumer and producer behavior and undergirds a thriving market for organiccertified products.235 The USDA Organic Seal effectively situates the public as
Who Are Organic Food Consumers? A Compilation and Review of Why People Purchase Organic
Food, 6 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 94, 103 (2007); Mette Wier, Laura Mørch Andersen & Katrin Millock,
Information Provision, Consumer Perceptions and Values—the Case of Organic Foods, in
ENVIRONMENT, INFORMATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 176.
231. For example, while research suggests that children eating organic as opposed to
conventional diets have lower exposure to some synthetic pesticides, see, e.g., Cynthia L. Curl, Richard
A. Fenske & Kai Elgethun, Organophosphorus Pesticide Exposure of Urban and Suburban Preschool
Children with Organic and Conventional Diets, 111 ENV’T HEALTH PERSP. 377–82 (Mar. 2003),
questions have been raised about inter alia whether exposure to synthetic pesticides through a
conventional diet in fact harms health and the potential health effects of natural pesticides permitted
for use in the production of organic products. See generally Carl K. Winter & Josh M. Katz, Dietary
Exposure to Pesticide Residues from Commodities Alleged to Contain the Highest Contamination
Levels, 2011 J. TOXICOLOGY 6 (May 15, 2011).
232. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.311 (2021).
233. E.g., Melinda Wenner Moyer, Organic Shmorganic: Conventional Fruits and Vegetables
Are Perfectly Health for Kids, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2014), https://slate.com/humaninterest/2014/01/organic-vs-conventional-produce-for-kids-you-dont-need-to-fear-pesticides.html
[https://perma.cc/TP4R-SNW7].
234. ACADEMICS REVIEW, ORGANIC MARKETING REPORT (2014) (describing “pervasive”
“organic marketing campaigns that imply or directly assert food health and safety risks with foods
produced using competing conventional practices” and concluding that because of consumer reliance
on the USDA Organic Seal “the American taxpayer funded national organic program is playing an
ongoing role in misleading consumers into spending billions of dollars in organic purchasing decisions
based on false and misleading health, safety and quality claims.”).
235. Calorie labeling provides another similar example. Requiring that certain restaurants reveal
calorie counts to consumers appears to have caused restaurants to make their offerings less calorieheavy, but evidence is mixed regarding whether calorie counts cause individuals to choose lower
calorie options. Jason J. Czarnezki, New York City Rules! Regulatory Models for Environmental and
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a catalyst because the public’s response to the Seal supports the market for
goods bearing the Seal. From the perspective of organic producers, the USDA
Organic Seal effectively situates the public as a target because its presence
encourages some portion of the public to purchase goods bearing the Seal.
However, as with TRI, Proposition 65, and NEPA, the USDA Organic Seal
arguably is not as effective in situating the public as an audience, at least with
respect to supporting accurate, meaningfully-informed consumer choice.
Indeed, it appears that the failure of the USDA Organic Seal as an audience
measure (the extent to which consumers misunderstand its significance and
erroneously ascribe health and exaggerated environmental benefits to the Seal)
may actually enhance its power to influence the public as a target and catalyze
upstream producer behavior.236
The program thus successfully deploys the disclosure of information about
food production methods to consumers so as to allow the public to serve as a
catalyst for upstream producer behavior (encouraging through a growing
consumer market increased production of organic products) and also to target
the public’s consumption behaviors (spurring demand for food produced
through what at least some members of the public perceive to be more
environmentally sensitive methods). However, although the Organic Foods
Production Act was aimed in part at alleviating consumer confusion regarding
the meaning of organic claims,237 it is far less clear that the USDA Organic Seal
functions effectively when the public is viewed as an audience to be educated
about the environmental facts of food production and consumption. Some
Public Health, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1621, 1657 (2015) (“[I]t is not clear that calorie labeling has been
directly effective in reducing calorie consumption. That said, there may be substantial ancillary
benefits. . . . [D]ue to labeling, the evidence suggest that existing menus will likely be modified to
include healthier, low-calorie items.”).
236. The way that erroneous understandings of what the USDA Organic Seal signals about the
health and environmental attributes of labelled products can spur an exaggerated public response and
correlated upstream (market) behavior is reminiscent of the documented potential for public
misunderstandings about small risks from chemical exposure to cause the public to overreact to
disclosures under TRI and Proposition 65, thereby enhancing the catalyst effects of disclosure under
those measures, see supra note 13 and infra note 274 and accompanying text. The potential for
slippage between fact and public understanding after information disclosure is perhaps especially
pronounced in the environmental context where the public has little first-hand knowledge and the
underlying questions may require scientific explanation. See generally Anthony Patt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Behavioral Perceptions and Policies Toward the Environment, in JUDGMENTS,
DECISIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 273 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., 2002) (“Many
environmental problems are abstract and are recognized as problems only because scientists tell us
about them. People cannot directly sense ozone holes, increased climate variability, or the relationship
between toxic waste and cancer rates. Thus they are readily subject to manipulating tales and
images.”).
237. 7 U.S.C. § 6501(2)–(3).
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evidence suggests that the information communicated through the National
Organic Program has done little to help consumers understand how their
consumption decisions impact the environment or health.238 Experience with
the USDA Organic Seal—often misunderstood by consumers, but supporting a
booming market—again illustrates the difficulty of educating the public as an
audience and the potential for disconnect, i.e., for disclosure to support
upstream catalyst effects even in the absence of public understanding of
disclosed information.
E. Behavioral Interventions
Some environmental policies attempt to use informational regulation to
directly influence the behaviors of individuals in desired directions, thereby
situating the public as a target. Because these measures seek to steer individuals
toward or away from specific behaviors, they differ from measures that situate
the public simply as an audience, i.e., provide information to empower
individual autonomy and choice while remaining agnostic as to the choices
individuals ultimately make. Informational regulation in service of behavioral
interventions typically, however, anticipates successfully speaking to the public
as an audience as a means to achieve the desired behavior change, resting on
the assumption that providing information or education will lead to the desired
changes in behavior. In short, these approaches seek to educate individuals to
encourage a specified, public policy favored change in individual behavior. For
example, municipal authorities may stencil images of fish and text explaining
that the collection area drains to a watershed that in the hopes that, so informed
(audience), individuals will choose not to send harmful toxics into the drain
(target). Or utilities may provide customers with new information revealing
how their use of power compares to similarly situated neighbors to educate the
customer (audience) in the hopes of encouraging energy conservation behavior
(target).
Two notable types of behavioral interventions are risk avoidance policies
and persuasive campaigns. Risk avoidance signifies “a regulatory approach

238. Notably, one study suggests that in Denmark, which coupled organic labeling efforts with
public information campaigns explaining the public good attributes of organic farming (environmental
and animal welfare), consumers “have a good understanding of the organic rules” but nonetheless are
motivated to purchase food with organic labels in large measure as a result of the perceived private
goods associated with organic foods (health, taste and freshness) which are not part of the labeling
scheme. Wier, Andersen & Millock, supra note 230, at 166, 176–77 (“Consequently, even though the
Danish organic label and the associated public campaigns lay emphasis on public-good attributes
exclusively, consumers seem to create their own perceptions on top of this information. They have a
good understanding of the organic production rules, but they perceive the consequences of employing
these partly independently of the information provided.”).
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that addresses environmental risks by asking those whose practices or lifeways
expose them to contaminants to alter their ways to avoid exposure.”239 It
includes measures such as fish and wildlife consumption advisories, ozone
alerts, beach advisories and closures, and boil-water notices.240 Persuasive
campaigns use information disclosure as one means to persuade individuals to
voluntarily change environmentally significant individual behaviors to achieve
environmental benefits. Examples include, inter alia, efforts to encourage
individuals to reduce energy consumption,241 recycle,242 and limit storm drain
runoff.243 The use of informational regulation for risk avoidance and as part of
persuasive campaigns are analyzed below.
1. Risk Avoidance
The concept of risk avoidance as well as many of the examples that follow
are borrowed from an article by Catherine O’Neill, No Mud Pies: Risk
Avoidance as Risk Regulation.244 That article critically analyzes risk avoidance
as a means to augment traditional controls on environmental harms where those
controls have not succeeded in reducing risk to acceptable levels.245 Although
O’Neill does not frame risk avoidance policies as a form of informational
regulation per se, many of the risk avoidance policies she examines constitute
informational regulation because they disclose information about risk to

239. Catherine A. O’Neill, No Mud Pies: Risk Avoidance As Risk Regulation, 31 VT. REV. 273,
274 (2007).
240. Proposition 65’s produce warning labels arguably also fall within this category, although
because of its orientation toward influencing firm behavior, Proposition 65 was discussed with the
previous group.
241. Matto Mildenberger, Leah Stokes, Beth Savan, Brian Kolenda & Dan Dolderman, Beyond
the Information Campaign: Community-Based Energy Behavioral Change at the University of
Toronto, ENV’T PRAC. 1–2 (noting that many efforts to reduce energy consumption have consisted of
public education campaigns).
242. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. REV. 1231, 1235 (2001) (“New York City, for
example, uses ad campaigns featuring Oscar the Grouch and Yankee manager Joe Torre to encourage
household recycling; many states exhort their residents to recycle through persuasive mailers sent to
individual households; state recycling curricula aimed at young children are commonplace.”); see also
id. at 1269–70.
243. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 39.
244. O’Neill, supra note 239. For an interesting assessment of hazard communication and
individual responses, see Sims & Baumann, supra note 89, at 170 (“In sum, the evidence supporting
the causal link between hazard awareness and protective responses is minimal, and correspondingly,
the evidence documenting the failure of such educational efforts is considerable.”).
245. O’Neill, supra note 239, at 274 (“Risk avoidance stands in contrast to risk reduction, which
addresses environmental risks by requiring contaminants to be prevented, reduced, or cleaned up at the
source. Risk avoidance leaves contamination unabated, in whole or in part. It places responsibility on
those exposed to avoid the fish, water, soils, or air left polluted.”).
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individuals to encourage those individuals to voluntarily avoid risk.246 Risk
avoidance strategies thus position the public as a target of information
disclosure—they seek to use information disclosure to persuade individuals to
behave in ways that limit exposure to environmental risk.247 Fish consumption
advisories provide a particularly useful exemplar.
According to the EPA, in 2011, there were 4,821 fish advisories in effect
covering 42% of the nation’s total lake acreage and 36% of the nation’s total
river miles.248 The vast majority of these advisories—94%—involved five
bioaccumulative chemical contaminants: Mercury, PCBs, chlordane, dioxins,
and DDT.249 Fish consumption advisories are typically developed by state
public health and environmental agencies,250 although EPA and the Federal
Drug Administration have issued a joint federal advisory for mercury in fish.251
EPA compiles access to advisories issued by states, territories, and tribes.252
Fish advisories provide individuals with information about the levels of
contaminants in fish and about the amount of fish it is safe to eat in an effort to
spur individuals to voluntarily limit their consumption of fish to safe amounts:
246. Id.
247. O'Neill, supra note 239, at 278–79. One might conceive of fish consumption advisories as
situating the public as an audience in the sense that advisories could be viewed as providing individuals
with information about the risks fish consumption so as to enable informed consumption choices.
However, fish consumption advisories start from the proposition that certain levels of fish consumption
are likely to result in exposures established as unsafe and seek to protect the citizenry from such unsafe
exposures. This is in contrast to Proposition 65, for example, which was initially explained in part as
an effort to allow individuals to select an exposure to risk that was more protective than that settled
upon as acceptable by regulators, see supra notes 124–27 and accompanying text, discussing the
legislative history of Proposition 65. Although this distinction is somewhat fine, it is significant. Fish
consumption advisories are best characterized as measures that situate the public as a target whose
behavior the advisories seek to influence in specific directions.
248. National Listing of Fish Advisories: General Fact Sheet 2011, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/fishshellfish/fishadvisories/generalfs2011.cfm
[https://perma.cc/WUR9-LAE7].
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., W. VA. BUREAU FOR PUB. HEALTH, W. VA. DIV. ENV’T PROT., & W. VA. DIV.
NAT. RES., WEST VIRGINIA FISH CONSUMPTION ADVISORY INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT (2000).
There does not appear to be a single (federal) authority compelling the production of state fish
consumption advisories, although fish advisories may sometimes be issued as an institutional control
under CERCLA or RCRA and states often identify water bodies as impaired on the lists required to be
submitted under section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act because the water body does not support the
fish consumption use as a result of a restricted or no consumption fish advisory.
251. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY & FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 38. A proposed update to
has been published and made available for public comment. Env’t Prot. Agency & Food and Drug
Admin., Advice About Eating Fish: Availability of Draft Update, 79 Fed. Reg. 33559 (June 11, 2014).
252. State, Territorial and Tribal Fish Consumption Advisories, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/fish-tech/state-territorial-and-tribal-fish-consumption-advisories
[https://perma.cc/XC4Q-885L].
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Fish consumption advisories are directed to people who would
consume fish from contaminated waters, particularly those
subpopulations likely to suffer adverse effects given the
contaminants at issue.
Advisories typically provide information about the nature
and extent of the contamination (e.g., indicating the water
bodies affected and the fish species implicated) and its adverse
health effects (e.g., noting whether the contaminants of
concern are carcinogens, neurodevelopmental toxins, etc.).
Advisories then recommend avoidance by one or more of
several means (e.g., refraining altogether from eating a
particular species; reducing the amount of fish over a certain
size or age that is consumed; substituting alternate fishing sites;
or altering preparation methods).253
There is no established protocol for the design and communication of fish
consumption advisories, which are often developed by individual states,
localities, and government agencies, although there is some evidence of a
growing consensus around best fish advisory practices.254 The considerations
involved in designing and distributing advisories are complex—for example,
how to communicate the risks of toxics as well as the health benefits of fish
consumption, and how best to reach different audiences. Questions about
content, presentation, format, and distribution methods (e.g., signs posted near
water bodies, mass media public service announcements, wallet cards and
refrigerator magnets) can generate disagreement.255 EPA, for example, relied
primarily on health care professionals and public service announcements to
publicize its 2004 FDA/EPA Consumer Advisory: “What You Need to Know
About Mercury in Fish and Shellfish”;256 many have been critical of EPA’s
253. O’Neill, supra note 239, at 278–79.
254. T. BRUCE LAUBER, NANCY A. CONNELLY, JEFF NIEDERDEPPE & BARBARA A. KNUTH,
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT FISH CONSUMPTION ADVISORIES: INSIGHTS FROM EXPERTS AND THE
LITERATURE (Sept. 2013).
255. Id. at 4–31 (describing the results of a survey of fish advisory practitioners).
256. U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, BACKGROUNDER FOR THE 2004 FDA/EPA CONSUMER
ADVISORY: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT MERCURY IN FISH AND SHELLFISH (Mar. 2004),
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/backgrounder-2004-fda-epa.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EQ33-Z8R5] (“FDA and EPA are planning a comprehensive educational campaign
to reach: women who might become pregnant; pregnant women; nursing mothers; and young children.
The agencies will work with state, local and tribal health departments to get information out into their
communities. Physicians, other health professionals, and health care associations will be sent
information to distribute through their offices. Extensive outreach through the media is also planned.
Radio and television stations, health editors at newspapers, magazines, and other popular media will
be contacted to encourage them to carry the public service message. The methylmercury advisory will
also be an important part of a comprehensive food safety education program to be used by educators
of pregnant women. FDA plans to launch the comprehensive education program later this year.”).
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dissemination effort and suggested that the advisory would have been much
more useful if EPA had provided it at the point of sale.257
Significant questions remain about the extent to which the fish consumption
advisories are received and understood and succeed in convincing individuals
to change their behavior to avoid the risks of excess consumption of
contaminated fish, although there is reason to be doubtful about their
performance. A 2013 study prepared by the Human Dimensions Research Unit
in Cornell University’s Department of Natural Resources, which set out to
“synthesize existing knowledge about effective fish consumption advisory
practice,”258 concludes that little is known about the effect of advisories on
public consumption:
The existing literature has yielded insights into how key
audiences interpret fish consumption advisory materials.
However, little evidence exists to demonstrate the degree to
which these [fish consumption advisory] materials actually
influence behavior and reduce the exposure of target audiences
to contaminants in fish. The types of evidence that would be
worthwhile to collect fall into two areas: (1) If target audiences
receive advisory materials . . . , to what degree do these
materials increase awareness and knowledge, influence fish
consumption behavior, and reduce exposure to contaminants?
(2) What delivery mechanisms are effective for getting these
materials to a large enough segment of a target audience to
influence the behavior of that audience?259
257. E.g., Katherine Renshaw, Sounding Alarms: Does Informational Regulation Help or
Hinder Environmentalism?, 14 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 654, 683–84 (2006) (“The FDA advisory fails to
reach numerous consumers because there is no way of guaranteeing that a consumer is aware of such
a warning at the time of purchase.”). Notably, California has successfully required that Proposition 65
warning related to the mercury content of seafood be posted in restaurants, Proposition 65 Fish Cases,
Consent Judgment, Case Nos. CGC-03419292, BC-293749 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 2005), and many
supermarkets have voluntarily posted mercury seafood warnings while a Proposition 65 case against
supermarkets is pending, Jane Kay, Grocers Post Mercury Warnings on Fish/Safeway and Others
Respond to State Suit, S.F. CHRONICLE, Feb. 21, 2003, at A17. The California AG was unable,
however, to require that point of sale or label warnings be applied to canned tuna based on a court
finding that mercury in tuna is naturally occurring and thus exempt from Proposition 65 disclosure.
People ex rel. Brown v. Tri-Union Seafoods, LLC, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1549, 1576, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644,
664 (2009) (“We affirm the judgment on the narrow ground that substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that methylmercury in tuna is naturally occurring, and thereby removing the Tuna
Companies from the reach of Proposition 65.”).
258. LAUBER, CONNELLY, NIEDERDEPPE & KNUTH, supra note 254, at i.
259. Id. at iii, 45. The report acknowledges that there are many recommendations for how to
communicate fish advisory information. Building on knowledge from the literature and practitioners
with expertise in fish consumption advisory communication, the report offers numerous

KUH_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

INFORMATIONAL REGULATION, ENVIRONMENT, & PUBLIC

653

Other research concludes that fish consumption advisories, at least as
historically constituted and distributed, are often unnoticed, misunderstood, or
disregarded:
There is ample evidence that advisories and warnings often do
not reach their intended audience. For example, a recent study
showed that half of those consuming fish caught on the Great
Lakes were unaware of the relevant fish consumption
advisories. Similarly, another study found that only 45% of
those fishing the Newark Bay Complex were aware of the
relevant fish and crab consumption advisories . . . . Even if
risk avoidance measures are completely effective in each of
these two respects—they reach and are understood by their
intended audiences and they are maintained in perpetuity—it
is enormously difficult to effect behavior changes in
people. . . . According to one recent survey, of the 48.5% of
respondents who were aware of the relevant fish consumption
advisories for the San Francisco Bay, only 60.3% reported
reducing their fish intake as a result. Indeed, health and
environmental agencies have emphasized the difficulty of
getting risk-bearers to “comply” with fish consumption
advisories by altering their preparation and consumption
practices.260
Thus, although fish consumption advisories are expressly intended to
“[e]nable target audiences to make informed choices about eating fish”261 and
avoid harms associated with excessive consumption of contaminated fish, they
often fail to inform a large number of individuals and do not appear to be
particularly successful at influencing public behavior.262 This is so even though
the individuals to whom the information is directed may face significant
personal health risks by failing to heed the relevant warnings.263
Where individuals receive and comprehend advisories but nonetheless
choose to consume fish in contraindicated ways, the advisories do inform
choice and thereby satisfy the audience function (i.e., individuals may
understand but nonetheless choose to accept risks from the consumption of
recommendations about how to design fish consumption advisories to effectively communicate
information to the public. Id. at i–ii. A literature review suggested that it is important inter alia to
keep messages simple and include information about risks and benefits. Id. at 32–42. A survey of
experts in the field yielded agreement that advisories should, inter alia, be concise, use simple and
readily understood language, communicate easily-followed recommendations, provide balanced
information about risks and benefits, and be limited in number. Id. at 4–9.
260. O’Neill, supra note 239, at 312, 314–15 (internal citations omitted).
261. LAUBER, CONNELLY, NIEDERDEPPE & KNUTH, supra note 254, at 44.
262. O’Neill, supra note 239, at 312–13, 315.
263. Id.
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contaminated fish); the advisory would still, however, fail to satisfy the target
function of keeping consumption within levels of acceptable risk. Where
individuals fail to become aware of or comprehend an advisory, it would fail
both the audience and target functions. Although knowledge about the efficacy
of fish consumption advisories is incomplete, existing learning signals
difficulties both in use of such advisories to reach and educate the individuals
(audience) and prompt them to change their behavior as a result of the received
information (target).
2. Persuasive Campaigns
Information strategies are also often used—independently, or in
conjunction with economic incentives or other inducements—to persuade
individuals to voluntarily change environmentally significant individual
behaviors to achieve environmental benefits.264 These information strategies
thus position the public as a regulatory target.265 Sometimes these efforts take
the form of relatively unadorned information disclosure (such as stenciling
storm drains to indicate the water body receiving run off to serve as educational
reminders to the public that storm drains often discharge untreated runoff
directly into rivers and lakes and discourage individuals from dumping litter,
oil, etc.266). At other times, campaigns to change individual environmental
behaviors not only include the disclosure of information (for example,
publicizing the environmental benefits of and possibilities for recycling), but
also deploy jingles, endorsements, or appeals to social norms in an effort to
persuade.267 In the context of energy demand reduction, for example, peerbased comparative feedback seeks to tap into the power of social norms to
motivate individuals to reduce energy use by providing information about how

264. E.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 29, at 613–15.
265. By way of distinction from risk avoidance strategies, where the motivation is to help
individuals obtain a private health benefit (reduced exposure to a health risk), these persuasive
measures are typically motivated by a desire to change behavior to achieve a public benefit (minimizing
solid waste, decreasing energy consumption, reducing pollutants in stormwater runoff). Of note,
however, where there are both public and private benefits associated with conduct (reducing energy
consumption may save an individual money, acting in a “green” way may make individuals feel good
(give them a “green halo”) or have positive reputational effects), persuasive campaigns may highlight
those private co-benefits to spur greater behavior change. Czarnezki & Kuh, supra note 201, at 450
(proposing improvements to eco-labels to improve efficacy grounded in evolutionary psychology,
including emphasis on private consumer benefits).
266. Storm
Drains
&
Stenciling,
CLEAN
OCEANS
ACTION,
https://cleanoceanaction.org/education-programs/storm-drain-stenciling
[https://perma.cc/4YCY6ZDE].
267. For an overview and critique of the use of persuasive campaigns to influence individual
behaviors in the environmental context, see Vandenbergh, supra note 29, at 610–17.
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an individual’s energy consumption compares to that of similarly situated
peers.268 In part because of feasibility and other concerns about alternate
methods of regulating individual behavior (for example, mandates),269
informational approaches are viewed as an important tool for influencing
environmentally significant individual behaviors.270
Although the
sophistication of communicating with individuals in this context is growing,271
experience and research to date attest to the challenges of relying on
information to change environmentally significant individual behaviors,
particularly outside of the consumer context.272
It is generally understood to be quite difficult to change individual
behaviors using information strategies alone; significant challenges exist in
formulating information disclosure strategies that lead individuals to
voluntarily change behavior in desired ways.273 As in the context of risk
268. ENERGY & ENV’T ECONS., OVERVIEW OF RESIDENTIAL ENERGY FEEDBACK AND
BEHAVIOR-BASED ENERGY EFFICIENCY 18–20 (Feb. 2011).
269. For example, “[a]gencies have begun to develop regulations and policies that reflect the
insights of behavioral economics, and the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has introduced behavioral economics to White House
review of agency regulations.” Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. REV. 715, 716–17 (2011) (analyzing inter alia
how regulation designed to influence individual behavior, including through public information
campaigns, can become more effective by taking into account psychological and behavioral insights,
such as the effects of motivational crowding, framing, and pluralistic ignorance).
270. Folke Ölander & John Thogersen, Informing Versus Nudging in Environmental Policy, 37
J. CONSUMER POL’Y 341, 342 (2014) (observing that other instruments for changing behavior, such as
economic measures and legal regulation, “are often met by public and political resistance that can block
them from being decided and implemented and alone, they are often insufficient.”); Carlson, supra
note 242, at 1235 (“When numerous people must act to solve a collective problem and lack the
economic incentive to do so, traditional government regulation, such as formal law, may be infeasible,
ineffectual, or politically difficult. The costs of monitoring and enforcement can be prohibitively
expensive or may raise privacy concerns.”).
271. See Mildenberger, Stokes, Savan, Kolenda & Dolderman, supra note 241, at 3–8
(describing community-based social marketing).
272. And, as discussed supra, although in the consumer context eco-labels sometimes can and
do change some individual purchasing decisions and thereby occasion market effects, significant
questions remain about the extent to which the information provided on labels results in meaningfully
informed choice with respect to purchasing decisions.
273. Ölander & Thogersen, supra note 270, at 342–43 (reviewing relevant studies and
concluding that “all in all, what emerges about the possibilities to achieve behavioural change in the
environmental field by means of mass media communication is not very heartening.”); Paul C. Stern,
Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 461,
464–66, 468 (1999) (“In short, information alone can, if carefully designed and delivered, change
certain kinds of environmentally significant consumer behaviors to a modest extent. However, little
or no effect has been achieved when there are important barriers to action external to the individual,
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avoidance, difficulties inhere both in effectively communicating relevant
information to individuals (audience) and generating behavior changes in
response (target). With respect to the former, individuals often do not receive
and respond to information in “rational” ways—a host of cognitive biases,
perspectives informed by cultural worldview, personal and social norms and
competing values, and other motivations and variables inform how individuals
comprehend and respond to information.274 With respect to the latter
(translating information into behavior change), individual behaviors amenable
to change are often limited to those where there are low “barriers” to change
(e.g., they do not impose significant monetary costs, they are not inconvenient,
and there is infrastructure such as public transportation to support the
change).275 Frustration with or simply recognition of the limitations of
such as significant financial cost or inconvenience.”); Carlson, supra note 242, at 1236 (reviewing
research demonstrating that increasing convenience is much more effective at increasing recycling
behaviors than norm management (using informational strategies) and concluding that “[t]hough social
norms can, and sometimes do, play a role in encouraging cooperative behavior to resolve large-number,
small-payoff problems, if recycling is any indication, their force is fairly limited.”).
274. E.g., Paul C. Stern, Toward a Coherent Theory of Environmentally Significant Behavior,
56 J. SOC. ISSUES 407, 416–18 (2000); Amanda R. Carrico, Michael P. Vandenbergh, Paul C. Stern,
Gerald T. Gardner, Thomas Dietz & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Energy and Climate Change: Key Lessons
for Implementing the Behavioral Wedge, 2011 J. ENERGY & ENV’T L. 61–67 (2011); Kahan & Braman,
supra note 87, at 170; Vandenbergh, Carrico & Schultz, supra note 269, at 716–17. For example, a
sign posted in the Petrified Forest National Park in Arizona as part of a research study that read, “Many
past visitors have removed the petrified wood from the park, changing the state of the Petrified Forest,”
appeared to encourage the theft of petrified wood, perhaps by “signal[ing] to park visitors who would
otherwise not have stolen that stealing the petrified wood was a common behavior.” Kesten C. Green
& J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J. PUB.
POL’Y & MKTG. 293, 295–96 (2012) (concluding that “attempts to change behavior using mandatory
disclaimers are often ineffective and, in many cases, lead to effects that are opposite to those
intended.”).
275. Stern, supra note 274, at 464–66 (“The chief implication for policy is that the extent to
which behavior can be changed by interventions in the personal domain, such as education or
information, depends on the strength of contextual forces: There are times and places when personaldomain interventions are likely to be effective and others when they will predictably fail.”); id. at 468
(“[E]ven information programs that are carefully designed to achieve these objectives produce only
modest short-term behavioral changes. The most carefully crafted informational interventions have
produced reductions of 10–20% in certain targeted consumer behaviors, such as littering, electricity
consumption during peak-load periods, and electricity use for home cooling. The behaviors that
change to produce these effects are almost always simple behaviors that can be changed with little
inconvenience or expense—that is, behaviors for which external constraints are weak.”); Carlson,
supra note 242, at 1295–1300 (describing lessons from empirical data on recycling participation for
efforts to change individual behaviors with respect to “large-number, small-payoff collective action
problems,” including that measures to increase the convenience of a behavior may be particularly
important for “high-effort” behaviors and that simply providing individuals with information without
more is often not sufficient to achieve behavior change). See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack
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information-driven efforts to influence individual behaviors causes some
scholars to recommend a focus on other approaches as a means to influence
environmentally significant individual behavior.276 On the other hand, there is
some optimism that more carefully crafted and better funded public information
campaigns may prove more effective.277 Further, there is evidence that
providing individuals with information has significant potential to complement
and enhance efforts to influence behavior using other modalities (economic
incentives, mandates, etc.).278 Overall, however, experience with persuasive
campaigns likewise reveals difficulties both in communicating information
effectively to individuals (audience) and prompting individuals to change their
behavior in response (target).
This Part reviews use of informational regulation in different environmental
policy settings, applying a three-part typology characterizing how the public
operates in informational regulation regimes in different potential capacities, as
an “audience,” “catalyst,” or “target.” The survey across a wide array of
settings suggests that, in terms of efficacy, such regulation in the environmental
context appears to function best when the public is positioned as a catalyst for
influencing upstream agency, corporate or market behaviors. Broadly
speaking, informational regulation in the environmental context has leveraged
Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1701, 1715–16 (2008) (suggesting that there is the best possibility to influence “low-hanging
fruit” individual GHG emission behaviors, meaning inter alia those that present low costs and few
other barriers to individuals, although observing that “if the perception that catastrophic climate change
is likely becomes widespread, then personal cost constraints may become less important to behavior
change efforts” and that “barriers can be overcome.”).
276. Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid: Technology and the Psychology of Environmental
Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139, 155 (2011) (arguing for increased reliance on
technology and automation to reduce energy demand); Cass R. Sunstein & Lucia A. Reisch,
Automatically Green: Behavioral Economics and Environmental Protection, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
128 (2014) (advocating for the use of “green defaults” in some contexts); BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER,
supra note 26, at 121–37 (criticizing information disclosure as a regulatory approach in part on the
grounds that even improved communication approaches incorporating behavioral insights cannot
overcome numerous identified difficulties posed by disclosure vis-à-vis individuals).
277. Vandenbergh, Barkenbus & Gilligan, supra note 275, at 1722 (“Public information
campaigns directed at environmentally significant behaviors have had mixed success in the past, but
many of them were severely underfunded. Recent literature reviews have concluded that more than
half of the well-designed and funded programs have resulted in significant and positive behavior
change, with changes in the targeted behaviors of 7 to 30 percent.”).
278. Stern, supra note 273, at 469 (“[T]he effectiveness of incentive programs depends on
factors in the personal domain and can be increased markedly by combining the incentives with
appropriate informational interventions.”); Carrico, Vandenbergh, Stern, Gardner, Dietz & Gilligan,
supra note 274, at 64 (“Although simply providing information to consumers is rarely sufficient to
change behavior, accurate and actionable information is often a necessary component to achieving this
end.”).
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disclosure to the public into (often beneficial)279 changes in commercial and
such behaviors. With respect to influencing individual knowledge and
behaviors when the public is positioned as an audience or target, to date, efforts
to engage the public through informational regulation in the environmental
context are less well understood and of decidedly mixed efficacy.280 It has
proved difficult to use information strategies (alone) to change individual
environmental behaviors,281 protect individuals from environmental risks,282
support environmental consumer choices,283 or educate the public about
environmental issues.284
Policies aimed at changing targeted public
environmental behaviors in desired ways, such as fish consumption advisories
and persuasive campaigns aimed at individual environmental behaviors, can
succeed in certain contexts, but must be supported by sophisticated research
and careful implementation. The next Part offers several tentative insights
about the role of the public in informational regulation based on the experience
in these settings.

279. Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing the benefits of NEPA). While
many reductions in releases under TRI have been considered beneficial, there are situations in which
that may not be the case (e.g., releases of non-TRI chemicals increase, and situations in which the
social value of reductions is outweighed by the social value of activity that produced these releases
that was curtailed). For a discussion of unintended negative consequences of mandated environmental
disclosure, see Volokh, supra note 12, at 814–38.
280. E.g., O’Neill, supra note 239, at 275 (describing and critiquing “the rise of risk avoidance
as a regulatory tool”); id. at 312 (“Risk avoidance is often ineffective . . . . There is ample evidence
that advisories and warnings often do not reach their intended audience.”); Lucia A. Reisch & Cass R.
Sunstein, Redesigning Cockpits, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 336 (2014) (commenting on the
acknowledgment by others that “information has not been proven to be a very successful means of
promoting voluntary behavior change to protect the environment.”).
281. E.g., Stern, supra note 276, at 155 (“Decades of information provision and behavior change
initiatives have made only limited headway in reducing electricity consumption—and those gains have
been virtually obliterated by the proliferation of energy-draining appliances such as computers and
flat-screen televisions.”).
282. O’Neill, supra note 239.
283. Lowenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 208, at 413 (reviewing studies assessing
disclosure and concluding that “[a]s a result of limited attention and many other psychological
factors . . . , disclosure requirements appear to have been less effective in changing recipient behavior
than their most ardent proponents seem to assume they are, or should be.”). See also Reisch &
Sunstein, supra note 280, at 335 (“When, for example, do disclosure policies actually affect
consumers? On that question, the most substantial questions are unanswered, with some evidence that
at least in some contexts consumers are often not much affected, but that producers do alter their
offerings.”).
284. See generally Kahan & Braman, supra note 87, at 170 (explaining how cultural cognition
shapes individuals’ acceptance of facts about climate change).
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IV. INSIGHTS FOR INFORMATIONAL REGULATION
A clear but somewhat puzzling phenomenon emerges from comparing how
informational regulation functions vis à vis the public across a variety of
environmental programs: Mandated public disclosure often fails to
meaningfully inform the lay public as an audience while nonetheless catalyzing
sometimes significant responses by upstream actors.
Considerable
commentary characterizes many of the information regulation approaches
discussed in Part III as successful examples of the genre because they have
influenced the behavior of upstream private sector and government entities in
ways beneficial to the environment.285 Although no definitive research
establishes precisely the extent of the change in behavior attributable to public
disclosure or precisely how and why regulated entities and agencies change
their behavior because of public disclosure,286 broadly speaking, informational
regulation in the environmental context successfully leverages disclosure to the
public into (often beneficial)287 changes in commercial and agency behaviors—
i.e., successfully deploys public disclosure as a catalyst for influencing
upstream commercial and agency behaviors.
Although the mechanism(s) by which the laws analyzed in Part III prompt
upstream catalyst effects are, like the extent of those effects, difficult to
quantify precisely, the mandated disclosure of information to the public is
285. See supra notes 98, 125–27, 163, 185–85, 196 and accompanying text.
286. E.g., KRAFT, STEPHAN & ABEL, supra note 43, at 40–41, 55, 139–40 (discussing the results
of an empirical study examining the means by which TRI disclosure prompts voluntary changes in
releases); Cohen, supra note 99, at 2. Laws mandating disclosure may also influence behavior for
reasons unrelated to public disclosure of information; for example, the requirement to generate the
information disclosed may alert entities to previously unrecognized inefficiencies or concerns. Id. In
the context of NEPA, agencies may make projects less environmentally harmful to avoid having to
engage in NEPA’s costly disclosure mechanisms, chiefly production of an EIS. Karkkainen, Framing
Rules, supra note 2, at 86 (“The widespread use of EAs, FONSIs, and mitigated FONSIs suggests that
NEPA has indeed changed the terms of decision-making in federal agency actions, generally elevating
the role of environmental considerations, albeit through a circuitous and unexpected backdoor route.
By imposing heavy administrative and procedural costs (those associated with EIS production) on
agency projects or programs that will cause severe adverse environmental impacts, NEPA
backhandedly creates an incentive for agencies either to design projects ab initio to reduce their
expected environmental impacts below the EIS-triggering threshold, or to add mitigation measures to
keep the environmental costs down, obviating the need to produce a costly EIS. In most cases it is
unlikely that agencies would have investigated, much less implemented, these environmentally benign
design alternatives or mitigation measures absent the incentives created by NEPA.”).
287. Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing the benefits of NEPA). While
many reductions in releases under TRI have been considered beneficial, there are situations in which
that may not be the case (e.g., releases of non-TRI chemicals increase, and situations in which the
social value of reductions is outweighed by the social value of activity that produced these releases
that was curtailed). For a discussion of unintended negative consequences of mandated environmental
disclosure, see Volokh, supra note 12, at 814–38.
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generally seen as an important part of the efficacy of these laws in changing
upstream entities’ environmental behaviors. Disclosure may shape behavior as
regulated entities and agencies respond substantively to public input (whether
through NEPA comments, consumer decisions, or in the form of public or
political pressure).288 Regulated entities and agencies may also change
behavior preemptively because they anticipate that the disclosure of
environmental information will harm their reputation, generate civic
opposition, give rise to legislative or regulatory obstacles or tort suits, or
occasion bad market effects as individuals (or investors) shun their services or
products.289 Interestingly, public disclosure appears to exert a powerful
influence despite the fact that individuals typically remain largely unaware of
or fail to understand the information subject to disclosure. These laws generate
public disclosure without widespread public comprehension—although they all
purport to engage or educate the public in some fashion, they all largely fail to
do so in a meaningful way.290 Yet, disclosure nonetheless prompts significant
upstream catalyst effects.
The role of intermediary groups in reacting to disclosed information
(community or interest groups, sophisticated investors), some prevalent tropes
in lay risk perception and related cognitive biases, simple overestimation, and
factors ancillary to disclosure mandates may all help explain the power of
disclosure sans widespread public comprehension.291 Organized interest or
community groups can effectively use disclosed information and publicize (or
threaten to publicize) the information to a broader public audience and use the
288. See Esty & Karpilow, supra note 1, at 631–36 (describing the internal and external
mechanisms through which disclosure can shape behavior). See also generally JOHN F. MANNING &
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 542–44 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing the
benefits of notice and comment rulemaking).
289. Esty & Karpilow, supra note 1, at 631–36; Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 6, at 155, 159
(1998) (“Dissemination of information about environmental performance can influence public opinion,
which can affect a business’s social franchise as well as its economic franchise. In an approach
emphasizing IR, rewards and punishments for environmental performance are given to businesses not
just by government, but by economic markets and the public opinions of society-at-large . . . .”);
Russell, Krarup & Clark, supra note 11, at 7; Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 341–54.
290. This failure of environmental disclosure statutes to function when the public is positioned
as an audience appears consistent with Ben-Shahar and Schneider’s critique of mandated disclosure
(when its goal is to treat the public as an audience and inform public choice) across a variety of
substantive subjects and statutes. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 26 (“[N]ot only does the
empirical evidence show that mandated disclosure regularly fails, failure is inherent in it.”).
291. See supra notes 94–97, 132–33 and accompanying text. In addition, TRI information has
prompted company decision makers to act on their own accord because it signaled inefficiencies and
opportunities to reduce waste. THOMAS GRAEDEL & JENNIFER HOWARD-GRENVILLE, GREENING THE
INDUSTRIAL FACILITY: PERSPECTIVES, APPROACHES, AND TOOLS 31 Text Box 3.1 (2005) (describing
Monsanto’s response to TRI data about releases).
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resulting public concern (or threat of the same) as currency to pressure
commercial entities or agencies.292 In some cases, the failure of the public to
accurately comprehend the information disclosed may work to enhance the
effect of disclosure.293 Various psychological factors may lead individuals to
overestimate the level of risk indicated by the disclosure and, accordingly,
magnify upstream incentives to avoid public backlash;294 public
misunderstanding of the meaning of the Organic Seal may broaden its appeal.295
Finally, entities subject to disclosure requirements may simply overestimate the
extent of public awareness of and sensitivity to disclosed information. Some
scholars refer to this as “the telltale heart effect”:
Why are providers changing their products in response to
disclosures that their customers are largely ignoring? . . . We
suspect that sellers may well have an inflated sense of the
public salience of disclosures, in a phenomenon related to the
spotlight effect, by which people exaggerate how much other
people are looking at them.296
This scenario is analogous to Edgar Allen Poe’s 1843 short story “The Telltale
Heart” in which the murderous protagonist . . . “imagines that the police can
hear the heartbeat of the man he has killed and buried beneath the floorboards
of his apartment.”297 Factors ancillary to disclosure mandates may also prompt
upstream effects.298 Entities potentially subject to disclosure requirements may
change course to avoid triggering disclosure mandates because the disclosure
292. Rechtschaffen, supra note 12, at 318 (“[O]nly a small number of motivated persons—e.g.,
attentive, information-seeking consumers, unions, or environmental organizations—actually needs to
use information to accomplish some of the desired benefits of information disclosure laws. A small
group’s energetic attention to warnings or other information can force product reformulation, safer
workplace conditions, or reductions in community exposures that benefit large numbers of consumers,
workers, or other individuals.”).
293. Id.
294. Viscusi, supra note 13, at 288 (“[W]hen individuals are informed of small risks there will
be a tendency for them to over-react to the information and to treat the risk as being greater than it
actually is. It will be very difficult to convey information to people in a meaningful fashion about very
low probability risks. Perhaps the major danger from any risk-communication effort is that instead of
informing people these programs will serve to unduly alarm them.”).
295. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
296. Loewenstein, Sunstein & Golman, supra note 208, at 404.
297. Id. at 403.
298. Khan M. R. Taufique, Kristian S. Nielsen, Thomas Dietz, Rachael Shwom, Paul C. Stern
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Revisiting the Promise of Carbon Labelling, 12 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 132–40 (2022) (reporting that carbon labels seem to produce clear upstream catalyst effects
on companies despite limited evidence of significate uptake by consumers and positing that “even
absent major shifts in consumer behavior, the process of gathering and analyzing the data for labeling
and the prospect of publicly disclosing product emissions can create corporate incentives for emissions
reductions.”).
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process itself (for example, preparation of an EIS) is burdensome.299 Engaging
in disclosure may reveal new information to disclosing entities, prompting
changes in behavior unrelated to any external pressures.300 The possibility that
disclosing information about chemical exposures will lead to litigation (in the
form of common law toxic tort or nuisance suits) could provide one such
external pressure that prompts a voluntary reduction of releases in response to
disclosure mandates. Regardless of the mechanism, it seems that these laws
employ informational regulation to influence upstream commercial and
government behavior without needing to or succeeding at consistently and
meaningfully advancing broader public understanding of the information that
they require to be disclosed.
The failure of environmental informational regulation to educate the public
as an audience while nonetheless supporting upstream catalyst effects suggests
some important insights. First and most plainly, disclosure is not functioning
well to directly inform or engage the lay public.301 The comparative analysis
underscores that this occurs across different statutes and policies that employ
informational regulation in the environmental context. None of the laws or
policies studied appears particularly effective in engaging the public as an
audience. 302 Yet TRI, Proposition 65, NEPA and the USDA Organic Seal all
aspire to position the public as an audience for environmental information to
inform choice about exposure to risk or enrich civic perspective; public
disclosure in these contexts is often justified or characterized as autonomy or
democracy enhancing.303 One contribution of the typology offered herein is to
separate out the audience and catalyst functions of disclosure, thereby
preventing the efficacy of disclosure at catalyzing upstream effects from
obscuring its struggle to inform the public.304
299. Karkkainen, Framing Rules, supra note 2, at 86 (explaining why agencies may reduce the
environmental impacts of proposals to avoid the need to prepare an EIS).
300. Esty & Karpilow, supra note 1, at 631 (Explaining how disclosure mandates can generate
internal pressure to change behavior: “First, the data may reveal production inefficiencies that were
previously unknown to corporate management. Such insights may stem from the firm’s analysis of its
own data. Or they may come when a firm uses the data to compare its environmental performance to
those of its competitors.”) (citations omitted).
301. See supra Part III.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. See generally Joshua Dunsby, Measuring Environmental Health Risks: The Negotiation of
a Public Right-to-Know Law, 29 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 269, 280–84 (2004) (revealing through
a close examination of implementation of California’s Air Toxics “Hot Spots” Information and
Assessment Act that success at disclosure of prompting catalyst changes in releases blunted demands
to orient disclosure toward public understanding, thereby illustrating the “potential conflict of

KUH_27APR22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

INFORMATIONAL REGULATION, ENVIRONMENT, & PUBLIC

663

Going forward, it will be important to clarify whether these broad audience
goals are, in fact, important. It may be that the audience justifications for,
characterizations and goals of these measures are largely hortatory or at least
secondary to achieving the desired upstream catalyst effects. It may also be
that the audience goal is important, but more limited in the sense that what we
value is protecting the right of every member of the lay public to know (should
they so choose), which makes it less troubling that the public largely chooses
not to exercise the right to know, leaving as the true audience for disclosed
information sophisticated actors such as intermediary groups and researchers.
If so, then perhaps the judgment should be simply to accept the limitations of
these disclosure measures in terms of communicating with the public. And
also, perhaps, to sharpen focus on how to improve the efficacy of disclosure for
creating desirable upstream catalyst effects.305
If, however, broad audience goals (meaning real public elucidation) are
deemed important (and, of note, in some contexts audience goals may be
central, for example with respect to the satisfaction of rights to information to
support environmental democracy as expressed in Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio
Conference on Environment and Development, the Aarhus Convention, and the
Escazú Agreement),306 then ensuring not just the technical availability of
information but real opportunity for understanding is imperative.307 The next
questions would be where and how communication strategies could be
improved308 while recognizing that there may be contexts (for example, with
regulatory goals . . . that is, the democratic dissemination of knowledge and the reduction of air
toxins.”). Of note, recent scholarship argues that the upstream catalyst effects of Proposition 65 are
more varied and powerful than previously recognized. Polsky & Schwarzman, supra note 130, at 827.
305. Taufique, Nielsen, Dietz, Shwom, Stern & Vandenbergh, supra note 297, at 137 (explaining
that while carbon labels have limited effect on consumers they appear to exert more notable influence
on companies and emphasizing “the need to prioritize corporate responsiveness in future work”
because “more needs to be known about corporations’ responses to labeling and about the types of
labels that may induce corporations to change the products offered to retail consumers even if consumer
responsiveness is limited.”).
306. David Takacs, Environmental Democracy and Forest Carbon (Redd+), 44 ENV’T L. 71,
79–86 (2014).
307. Id.
308. See generally Adena R. Rissman, Jessica Owley, Andrew W’Roe, Amy Wilson Morris &
Chloe B. Wardropper, Public Access to Spatial Data on Private-land Conservation, 22 ECOLOGY &
SOC’Y (June 2017), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26270141.pdf [https://perma.cc/64P8-846D]
(advocating for better public disclosure and availability of data about conservation lands including in
part by integrating data geospatial data into information networks because “[s]imple disclosure may
not necessarily increase accountability because large datasets can be difficult to comprehend and
require technical skills,” and “[i]nformation is useful for organizations and citizens when it increases
learning, including social learning through informal networks and formal learning forums.”); Amy
Wilson Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on Private Land Conservation:
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respect to the communication of chemical risk) in which audience goals are too
difficult to achieve. Going forward, care should be taken not to assume that the
public disclosure of information necessarily advances individual autonomy or
enriches civic perspective.309 And policymakers should approach proposals to
employ disclosure to engage the lay public as an audience for environmental
information with caution, cognizant of the challenges of doing so effectively.
A second insight of this Article’s typology is that upstream catalyst effects
from disclosure do not appear to be a direct response to informed public will.
This phenomenon—the use of disclosure to achieve changes in upstream
behavior without meaningfully advancing understanding by individuals—
should caution us against presuming that behavior change achieved through
disclosure necessarily aligns with individual or public preference. Put another
way, while informational regulation pours information into the public domain,
that public disclosure is often somewhat narrow in its function—it often serves
as a mechanism for influencing upstream behaviors without permeating the
public consciousness or changing the public’s behaviors.310 This finding raises
questions about the normative underpinnings of informational regulation
strategies and should encourage deeper analysis of how and why public
disclosure causes or contributes to upstream effects as well as of the normative
value of the upstream effects it produces. If public disclosure is not effectively
engaging the public as an audience, then it is questionable whether it should be
justified as enhancing individual autonomy or enriching individual civic
perspective. Moreover, that the upstream effects prompted by disclosure are
not a response to expressions of public preference (at least as unmediated by
intermediary groups) suggests that those effects should not be presumed to
reflect public preferences. Policymakers should carefully analyze the upstream
catalyst effects achieved through disclosure to understand whether they are, in
fact, normatively desirable.
This may be particularly important because of the outsized role of
intermediary groups in utilizing disclosed information.311 While individuals
Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. REV. 1237, 1280 (2009) (explaining the effort and
expense involved to make information about conservation easements accessible to the lay public in a
meaningful way and concluding that “[t]he amount of public money that should be invested in making
the data user friendly is, in the end, a public-policy decision that has to be made based on budget
priorities and the level of public interest in accessing data.”).
309. Morris & Rissman, supra note 308, at 1280.
310. Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 13, at 345 (critiquing the implementation of right-toknow laws and observing that “[t]he formal act of conveying risk information has taken precedence
over the information’s actual impact in reducing health risks.”).
311. For an explanation and critique of the role of intermediary groups in statutory participation
mechanisms, see Fiorino, supra note 82, at 531 (“Citizen participation came to be equated with interest
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may not be directly edified or engaged by information disclosure approaches,
organizations and organized groups often are.312 One scholar suggests that
“[c]urrent environmental information disclosure programs are generally
designed to provide information to environmentally knowledgeable people
rather than to the average citizen attempting to learn about the environment.”313
A third insight from application of the typology to the informational regulation
schemes discussed in Part III is to highlight the important role of intermediary
groups in informational regulation schemes that rely on information disclosure.
Intermediary groups actively seek out and utilize disclosed information and, in
many contexts, appear to play an important role in shaping upstream catalyst
effects.314 These groups can repackage and disseminate disclosed information
to strategically chosen segments of the lay public, thereby exerting significant
control over who in the public receives the information as well as the content
of that information. In thinking about the design and efficacy of environmental
information regulation, greater attention should be paid to the role of these
intermediary groups in deploying and shaping the response to publicly
disclosed environmental information.
It may be that we are comfortable with having disclosure measures function
in a pluralist manner with disclosed information largely mediated through
intermediary groups because we understand the goals of these groups to roughly
align with overall social utility or the public interest, or at least outcomes as a
result of their involvement roughly align with the same.315 Beyond traditional
pluralist accounts of the role of interest groups, quasi- and non-governmental
groups and actors can contribute to the development and implementation of
environmental law and policy in beneficial ways such that empowering these
group participation . . . . Citizens did not participate—they joined or otherwise supported interest
groups that participated on their behalf.”).
312. Id. at 529 (“Effective participation requires organization, resources, and professional
representation. Participation at the national level typically is indirect, because it is mediated through
voluntary associations organized to assert related interests . . . . The process concedes a marginal role
to the individual citizen.”).
313. Cohen, supra note 99, at 10427.
314. For example, environmental groups have played in an active role in enforcement under the
Clean Water Act through the filing of citizen suits using information contained in discharge monitoring
reports. David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C.
REV. 1, 24 (2014) (explaining that private enforcement has the potential to undermine national
consistency in addressing compliance challenges). See generally Seema Kakade & Matt Haber,
Detecting Corporate Environmental Cheating, 47 ECOLOGY L.Q. 771, 804 (2020) (proposing a greater
role for corporate self-monitoring and reporting to support enforcement and commenting on the value
of public disclosure and enforcement mechanisms under the Clean Water Act and acid rain provisions
of the Clean Air Act).
315. For a defense of deliberative democracy and a critique of NEPA as advancing pluralist and
synoptic discussion, see Poisner, supra note 12.
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groups and individuals with information is normatively desirable. Interesting
work evaluates the role of “boundary organizations,” less formal “knowledge
networks,”316 and consultants317 in the environmental context. But some cleareyed analysis and clarity in this regard seems prudent.
V. CONCLUSION
As compared to other regulatory tools, informational regulation is generally
understood to impose low implementation costs.318 It is also understood to offer
little assurance of achieving specific environmental goals because disclosing
entities ultimately decide whether or how to change behaviors and, as explained
above, the nature and cause of upstream effects from mandated disclosure are
difficult to predict and quantify.319 In part for this reason, informational
regulation is typically conceded to function best as a supplement to other, more
traditional forms of regulation that afford greater government control over
environmental outcomes.320 However, the relatively low cost of informational
regulation (in terms of political ease of adoption, government administration,
and regulated entity compliance) and its observed (if not well understood)
benefits make it an attractive policy approach.

316. Sonya Ziaja, Role of Knowledge Networks and Boundary Organizations in Coproduction:
A Short History of a Decision Support Tool and Model for Adapting Multiuse Reservoir and WaterEnergy Governance to Climate Change in California, 11 WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND SOC’Y 823, 842
(2019) (presenting a case study illustrating the value of knowledge networks and boundary groups in
the context of adapting water-energy governance to climate change). See also Scott E. Kalafatis, Maria
Carmen Lemos, Yun-Jia Lo & Kenneth A. Frank, Increasing Information Usability for Climate
Adaptation: The Role of Knowledge Networks and Communities of Practice, 32 GLOB. ENV’T CHANGE
30 (2015) (explaining the role of knowledge networks in the dissemination, understanding, and use of
information about climate change in the Great Lakes Community); Margaret Chon, Recasting
Intellectual Property in Light of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals: Toward Global Knowledge
Governance, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 763, 771 (2019) (evaluating the role of boundary organizations
in the development of intellectual property governance from the perspective of advancing the
Sustainable Development Goals).
317. Dave Owen, Consultants, the Environment, and the Law, 61 ARIZ. REV. 823, 868 (2019)
(evaluating the role of environmental consultants in the implementation of environmental law and
policy and observing that “public-choice theory predicts that the consulting sector will be particularly
well-positioned to influence administrative policy.”).
318. E.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY TOOLS: A USER’S GUIDE
199 Table 4–9 (1995).
319. Id. at 152 (“Most of these [information reporting] programs have no mechanism for forcing
less pollution from sources and thus cannot assure the public that goals will be met if they are
implemented.”).
320. Esty & Karpilow, supra note 1, at 635 (“[W]hile information regulation can play an
important role in furthering environmental goals, most scholars and policymakers see it as enhancing,
rather than displacing, more traditional forms of environmental regulation.”).
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By surfacing the extent which disclosure fails as a public audience measure
even while catalyzing upstream behavior effects, this Article’s typology
suggests some additional considerations in evaluating informational regulation
as a regulatory tool in the environmental context. First, the low implementation
costs for informational regulation may, in part, reflect a lack of effort in existing
disclosure regimes to effectively communicate disclosed information to the lay
public. A stronger governmental role in communicating disclosed information
to the lay public could enhance informational regulation’s ability to effectively
engage the public in some contexts, but would likely increase implementation
costs.
Second, with respect to the role of government in regulation, this Article
suggests that, despite the perception that informational regulation largely
preserves the status quo in terms of control over environmental outcomes,
government in fact cedes some control when it engages in environmental
informational regulation. Under informational regulation regimes, regulated
entities retain authority over whether and how to change environmental
behaviors (and there is not a shift of that authority to the government),
suggesting that such approaches maintain the status quo. However,
informational regulation significantly empowers intermediary groups by
equipping them with information. When it engages in informational regulation
in the environmental context, the government thus cedes authority to define
what goals are to be pursued once information is disclosed. For all of these
reasons, as policymakers refine existing environmental informational
regulation regimes and consider incorporating mandated disclosure in new
contexts, they should do so mindful of the difficulty of positioning the public
as an audience for disclosed information despite the potential for disclosure to
prompt upstream catalyst effects.

